

## **STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE NEED TO JOIN FORCES**

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### **ABSTRACT**

The successive world conflicts between the years 1914 and 1945 marked the European continent profoundly, not only this one, but also the other nations that were involved in these conflicts. This article aims to rescue, since the 1950s, the ways that Europe has found to prevent new conflicts, either through alliances or through its own mechanisms in function of the global, economic, political and social movement itself. In this way, using secondary sources and digital media (Internet), we tried to trace path dependence through process tracing to demonstrate the path that brought the European Economic Community (EEC), the current stage as European Union (EU) and within this, with its institutionalization, the mechanisms and instruments reached from the European Defense Community (EDC) in the 1950s to the present day with Permanent Structured Cooperation (CEP or PESCO).

**Keywords:** Integration. Permanent Structured Cooperation. NATO. Security and defense. Security and defense policies

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

In the aftermath of two violent world events which devastated Europe, but bringing about an increasingly lethal scientific and technological military improvement, efficient in mass destruction, Europe is united by peace, co-operation, to create a union among nations which made war against each other. An idea which was conceived by six countries, willing to join forces in a post- World War II period that affected not only Europe but also involved countries from all the continents.

Thereby, the treaties which formed what is now known as EU followed, a political-economic construction which started in 1951 with The Treaty of Paris – European Coal and Steel Community ( ECSC) - , proceeded with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 – EEC- and two treaties which consolidated the EU, Maastricht in 1992 and Lisbon in 2007, being evident in this period

the enlargement of the EU through the accession of new countries- except for the United Kingdom, with Brexit, though still undergoing the process of leaving the EU- being a sine qua non for the countries willing to join the EU, to respect EU values which are guided by “ respect for human dignity, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human rights” (Martins, 2004, p. 46).

Despite the peaceful atmosphere, the need for protection was not forgotten, being EDC proposed in the 1950s<sup>1</sup>, but rejected by the French National Assembly. Though it may seem incoherent to think that the French National Assembly had rejected this draft, since it was France itself which presented the draft through its representatives, what explains such fact is, at first instance, the German rearmament to act against the advance of North Korea upon South Korea, which worked as a trigger to provoke the intervention of the United States of America and Canada. Winston Churchill intervened in this process with a pressing need of establishing a “European armada”, under the authority of a European Defence Minister to cooperate with those countries, being later added by the Plevin Plan that this Minister “would be assisted by a Council of Ministers, under the control of a European Assembly and with a common military budget” (Pérez-Bustamante & Colsa, 2004, pp. 70-71). The acknowledgement of the prematurity towards arming Germany was followed by a time span during which disagreements between French and German parties occurred. The incidence of new conflicts caused the Treaty which established EDC to be signed in 1952, though it would still undergo ratification and recognition processes by the proper national parliaments, namely: The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. It was rejected in 1954 by the French National Assembly, resulting in the failure of the draft (*Idem*).

What is claimed towards this rejection is sourced in economic issues, according to the competitiveness of German war industry and Italian textile industry and on the political level, supra-nationality was questioned (*Idem*).

Although peace was aimed, regional conflicts proceeded, the Cold War, terrorism were events targeted by the Treaty of Washington and the founding charter of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whereby member nations make a commitment to work together “ sharing risks and responsibilities as well as benefits of collective defence.” (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2004, p.1), being the main objective of NATO to assure safety and freedom for every member, not only from Europe but also from North America, relying on its political influence and military power, according to the requirement of the action (*Idem*).

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<sup>1</sup> The Member States which took part in the Treaty of Brussels, signed in 1948, were: The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Luxembourg e Holland and, in 1954, Germany and Italy were integrated. (Portugal, n.d.).

From the moment NATO was established in 1949 to these two still incomplete decades in the XXIst century, the international scene has suffered changes according to the movement of societies, which means that political, social and economic foundations and cultures change, adjusting to the new times- although it is known that it is necessary to maintain them, since these products with touristic value can be put on the market – the social elements change in their shape, function, structure and processes as Milton Santos<sup>2</sup> would say, for they need to adjust to new times. Societies are always on the move; information technology brings societies closer, shows peoples' way of living, interaction<sup>3</sup> is planetary, but integration<sup>4</sup> isn't. The latter was in Jean Monnet's thinking, who believed in cooperation, in "integration between peoples and nations"[...] essential for the consolidation of Europe's security and prosperity during peacetime" (Maclay, 1998, p. 20).

## **2. THE PATHS FOR A PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION**

After the ratification of the EDC Treaty being rejected by the French National Assembly, the discussion over this issue was postponed without a scheduled day for further discussions on the text (Pérez-Bustamante & Colso, 2004).

With the articulation of The British Foreign Secretary, what becomes evident is that, having the treaty been rejected on 30th August 1954, the "Treaties of Paris re-establish the full sovereignty of Germany and the subsequent entrance in the Atlantic Alliance and in the Brussels Pact, reconfiguring into the Western European Union (WEO)", which happened on 30th October 1954<sup>5</sup> (Silva, 2010, p. 346), being a process of inter-governmental occurrence and of military basic competence, though sporadic, for the States preferred to resort to NATO for military diplomatic issues (Pérez-Bustamante & Colso, 2004).

The struggle to turn Europe into a "European Union", like in Monnet's approach, started to bear fruit with the Single European Act (SEA), in which the designation became gradually consolidated, appearing in the preamble of the document, although its founder was no longer present. Jean Monnet died on 16th March 1979, being the SEA signed in Luxembourg, on 17th February 1986 and, among other provisions, it establishes in Article 30 the formulation by the

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<sup>2</sup> Santos, M. (2002). *Por uma geografia nova: da crítica da geografia a uma geografia crítica*. São Paulo: EDUSP

<sup>3</sup> Interaction, according to Dicionário Aurélio de Português Online: "mutual influence of two or more elements." Access on: 13.fev/2018. Available on: <<https://dicionariodoaurelio.com/interacao>>.

<sup>4</sup> Integration according to Dicionário Aurélio de Português Online: "adaptation, incorporation of an external individual or group into a community or a setting." Access on: 13.fev/2018. Available on: <<https://dicionariodoaurelio.com/integrar>> .

<sup>5</sup> "The Treaties of Paris, which established WEO, were ratified by Germany and France [as well as] by Italy and BENELUX." (Pérez-Bustamante & Colso, 2004, p. 74).

Member States (MS) of a common European foreign policy, thereby committing themselves to mutual consultation “on any question of foreign policy that might be relevant to the security of the Member States.” (European Union, n.d.).

After the SEA there is a single market, the political integration is prepared – since the EU has been gradually institutionalised from the 1970’s onward- the economic and monetary integration, everything will be consolidated by the Treaty of Maastricht or the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (*Idem*), given that the TEU also introduced significant institutional reforms (Pérez-Bustamante & Colsa, 2004).

The TEU, signed in 1992, establishes the designation “European Union”, built on three pillars which are based on “ The European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. (PJCCM).” (EU, n.d. [n.p.]).

Already in the beginning of the 1950’s, Jean Monnet, a man of vision, said that:

*Our countries [...] have become small for the current world, we must have modern technical means, at the level of America and Russia today and of China and India of tomorrow. The unity of the European peoples assembled in the United States of Europe will be the means to raise standards of living and maintain peace* (Pérez-Bustamante & Colsa, 2004, p. 76). (author’s emphasis).

The approach of security, defence, the urgency with which the debate on the subject had been discussed since the proposition of EDC in the early 1950’s, were followed by other events which configured new scenarios, new actors, thus mechanisms and structures such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall, the Balkans Crisis were renewed, the latter proving EU’s fragility in the problem-solving capacity and lack of cooperation to resolve the conflict, being resolved by NATO and more specifically by the United States of America (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This evidence of weakness led to the realization that Europe should acquire an enhanced role at international level, in security and defence policy, in an independent way “[...] supported by credible military forces to respond to international crises” (*Idem*), a work carried out by Javier Solana in 1999 and concluded with the European Security Strategy in 2003, marking a milestone for EU foreign and security policy. During the same period, the desire for an armament agency proceeds, driven by the European defence industry, thus this issue was scheduled in the agenda in 2003 and the European Defence Agency was implemented - EDA- in 2004, on an intergovernmental basis, aiming at “developing defence capabilities in the area of crisis management, promoting and enhancing” European armament cooperation, stimulating advancements in technology, strategy and defence research, achieving a competitive market. (EDA, n.d, [n.p.]).

The European Security Strategy was a milestone for the ESDP and the EU and necessary, due to the events occurred according to the movement of international structures, such as terrorism, the progress of weapons of mass destruction programs, organised crime, conflicts in the Middle East, among others. In the document titled “ *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy*”, it is presented that, though already contributing with humanitarian assistance, which must be continued, the MS , under the tutelage of the EU, have to assume greater responsibilities, though respecting the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the independence and the sovereignty of the MS and the “principles and commitments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)”, strengthening the partnership with NATO.( Council of the European Union , 2009, p.9).

These changes in the international scenario and the need for bolder actions by the EU result in the restriction of American military power (The Iraq War), the replacement of Europe by Asia as an American priority (China’s Advance), the rejection of the European Constitution (2005), the euro crisis, the tide of ongoing conflicts (Arab Spring), terrorism (Gaspar & Pinto, 2016).

This raises thus the feeling that measures are to be taken, which happens in December 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in which significant changes regarding External Action and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, in particular, Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)” are made (*Idem Ibidem*, p.3). A further innovation in the Treaty of Lisbon is that it is supported by skills and no longer by pillars, which means that the skills attached to the EU by the MS and those which aren’t attached belong to the MS (Câmara, 2016) Therefore, instead of three pillars we have “three broad competence categories” such as: the exclusive competence of the Union. (Articles 2, (1) and 3 of the [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] (TFEU), a shared competence [...] (Articles 2 (2) and 4 of TFEU) and the supportive competence (Article 2, 5 and 6 of the TFEU).” (*Idem Ibidem*, p 12).

As it is a shared competence with the MS, not exclusive for the EU, the reference to CFSP will be implied in the Treaty of Lisbon, in Article 4(1) TFEU, being innovated as far as the instrumentalisation in the framework of CSDP is concerned.

### **3. PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION: THE NEED TO JOIN FORCES?**

With the change in the international scene, two new requirements emerge within the States which belong to NATO and the EU, in order to enhance their capabilities in the defence sphere. The first one relates to the need to re-evaluate the role of NATO and the contributions from the different states for its own survival. The second one is related to the need to re-evaluate the role of the EU countries in terms of their internal capabilities in the defence sphere.

### **3.1 The role of NATO**

As it was referred in the introduction of this article, NATO's main goal is to ensure safety and freedom to all its members, not only from Europe but also from The United States of America. However, it was soon realised a disparity among the contributions from each Member State to its action and survival, namely between the USA and the EU countries, a situation that has persisted quite literally until the present day.

In 2004, the disproportionality in terms of the involvement of financial and human resources between the USA and the other NATO Allies became clear, " the US continue to assume a disproportionate share of the Alliance's security costs and an unfair share of the responsibility for Alliance's actions", which demonstrates at this time a strain between the latter and the other Alliance members, since the European Allies and Canada didn't make the required investments to adapt their military capabilities to the new security challenges." (NATO, 2004, p.6). It was during the Kosovo crisis, that the dependence of the EU countries on the USA was brought to light, regarding the old continent's internal defence, being exposed the already marked European weaknesses in terms of defence (*Idem*).

With the increase of new threats, since then with different classifications and scales, namely: new conflicts in the Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine; terrorist attacks such as the September 11 in the USA and, more recently, attacks in European cities ( Paris, Brussels, Barcelona); the return to the "Cold War" climate, with the threat to use weapons of mass destruction by Iran, Iraq and North Korea, the vulnerability of the interconnected society (cybersecurity), all these new "fronts" have caused an increase in defence costs for the Allies (Ribeiro, 2002, 31st January; OTAN, 2004, p.7,13, 26, pp.38-39; Franco, 2017).

The budgetary issue has become more evident, with repeated warnings made by the USA<sup>6</sup> president, referring that the US taxpayers won't continue to pay for the defence of European countries, stating in one of those occasions, shortly before the opening of NATO summit, on 25th May 2017 in Brussels, that " 23 out of 28 Member States still don't contribute with the funds they were supposed to in order to pay for their defence and this is not fair for the population, for the US taxpayers" (Silva, 2017, [n.p]).

The pressure from the USA on the EU countries led to a stronger decision-making by the latter in 2017, resulting in the strengthening of its integration in the defence sphere, culminating in the implementation of PESCO, which "the almighty president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, considers PESCO as the sleeping beauty of The Treaty of Lisbon.

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<sup>6</sup> Regarding this subject, it is advised to read the book by Rogeiro, N. (2017). O Pacto Donald - Trump: "O Novo Contrato com a América" ou Fraude? Lisboa, 341p.

Although it was provided for in the Treaty, it has never gotten off the drawing” (US political Observatory, 2017, [n.p]).

### **3.2 Permanent structured cooperation**

Given the new world context in terms of conflicts and the need to reinforce EU’s role with regard to NATO, it has become imperative the integration of the EU countries in the defence sphere, so that it would be able to protect itself against attacks inside and outside the old continent. It is within this framework that PESCO is launched in November 2017, starting at two speeds: the first one on 13th November 2017 and the second one on 11th December 2017 (the Council of Europe, 2017), an issue to which I will return later, addressing firstly the context of emergence of PESCO.

As explained earlier, the need for protection was not forgotten, being EDC proposed in the 1950’s, though it wasn’t implemented, due to the above-mentioned reasons. With the creation of CFSP, the foundations are laid for what would become the current PESCO<sup>7</sup>, whose main periods can be divided into three stages: the first with TEU, the second with The Treaty of Lisbon and the third, the current one with its implementation<sup>8</sup>. The TEU involved new forms of cooperation, namely the cooperation among the EU governments within the framework of defence, justice and home affairs and introduces the possibility for an increased cooperation among the various Member States, in the areas of security and defence. Thus, by creating CFSP and inserted in the provisions relating to CSDP, PESCO is referred to in Article 42 (6) from the same treaty (Lisboa, 2008, p. 47(author’s emphasis), where

*Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) within the Union framework. This cooperation is governed in accordance with Article 46. This shall be without prejudice to Article 43.*

Later, the Treaty of Lisbon has strengthened what Laureano called (2012, p.3) 'Eurozone of defence', after the collapse or rejection of the European Constitution (2005). This treaty changed TEU and introduced the possibility for certain EU countries to reinforce cooperation in the

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<sup>7</sup> See PESCO current structure on EU External Action Service Website, PESCO Factsheet, December 2017, on url [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-Homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en)

<sup>8</sup>See text, *Cronologia: A cooperação da UE em matéria de segurança e defesa*. Available on: < <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/>. >

military sphere through the support of PESCO. This support can be noticed in Articles 1,2 and 3 of the protocol no. 10<sup>9</sup>, attached to the Treaty of Lisbon, relating to PESCO, established in Article 42 of TEU. The protocol no.10 stipulates two vital purposes,

*“on the one hand, it pursues further integration with regard to defence and the Common Security and Defence Policy, enabling a group of Member States to conduct civilian and military operations on behalf of the EU as a whole. On the other hand, it opens the way for the development of operational military capabilities of the Member States and, by doing it (mitigating the fragmentation and the duplication of effort) it creates important economies of scale for coherence of defence policies in each State as well as CSDP. This goal of further integration is maintained in a top-down manner: the Member States with greater political will and military operational capability lead the way in a process of greater co-operation which, instead of fragmenting policies, stimulates participation in this strategy, as it raises absence of mechanism costs” (Gomes, 2017, [n.p]).*

According to the same author “the establishment of PESCO is a step forward” in the gradual and progressive process of integrating defence policies.” and the main innovation in the Treaty of Lisbon (*Idem*). From the path between the Treaty of Lisbon and the present time, the defence issue is discussed again with some emphasis in the European Council on 20th December 2013, being identified priority actions to reinforce cooperation and on 28th June 2016<sup>10</sup>, with a presentation within the framework of global strategy for EU foreign and security policy by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the EU leaders assembled in the Brussels Summit.

As the new president of the USA assumed the position in 2017, with consequent pressure from the USA on the European countries, in spite of the commitment to cooperation between the EU and NATO(Council of Europe, 2017), the need to strengthen the EU role in the defence arises from the Member States and PESCO was launched in November 2017, for the reasons given above, starting at two speeds as it was previously referred: the first one, on 13th November 2017, when the Council receives a joint notification from several Member States, indicating its intention to participate in PESCO, in which ministers from 23 MS signed a joint notification and


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<sup>9</sup> See the Protocol 10 and 11, p. 175 to 178. Available on: < [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0022.02/DOC\\_3&format=PDF](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0022.02/DOC_3&format=PDF) . >

<sup>10</sup> See the meeting of the European Council. Available on: < <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/meetings/european-council/2016/06/28-29/> >.

submitted it to the High Representative and to the Council; the second one on 11th December 2017, when the Council adopted a decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 from the Council on 11th December 2017, establishing PESCO and in which Ireland and Portugal<sup>11</sup> notified their decision to join PESCO, being the 25 MS participants present in Article 2 of the Decision ( see figure 1). In relation to the Portuguese stance, Portugal had already indicated in 2010 the intention to join PESCO, “there is a clear political will on the part of Portugal to participate in PESCO since the first moment” (Report of defence, 2010, p.8). This will reflected in the Parliament Resolution no. 35/2018 of 7th February, in points 1 to 6.

**Figure 1: NATO, PESCO and European Union countries in the present.**



Source: Adapted from, Infographic: Valentin Kreiling, Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, 13th November 2017; Article 2 of Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of the Council on 11th December 2017.

As it is illustrated in Figure 1, the establishing of PESCO results in a clear overlapping of the EU Member States’ involvement in NATO and PESCO, which inevitably prompts the question as to whether PESCO is moving away from NATO, in the long and medium term, and replacing it. On this matter, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, alerted to the need for convergence towards the complementarity between both, so that “the European defence is developed to be

<sup>11</sup>See chronology and Portuguese decision regarding PESCO. Available on: <  
<https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Paginas/DetalleIniciativa.aspx?BID=41837;>>.  
<<https://www.tsf.pt/lusa/interior/ue-estabelece-cooperacao-estruturada-na-defesa-ja-com-portugal-incluido-8976663.html>>.

uncompetitive and complementary to NATO"<sup>12</sup>. According to Câmara (2016, p. 98), this is an impossibility, since CSDP “doesn’t intend to pursue a policy which is opposed to the one pursued by NATO (...)”, since both uphold the same values and principles<sup>13</sup>. As a matter of fact, keeping global peace in Europe during the post- World War II period results from two fundamental points till now: the first one, which led both to the creation of EDC and the armament process in European countries to fail; the second one, the good co-operation relations between the USA and the European MS, NATO Allies. In a fairly polarised world, it is afflicting that, in an attempt to reinforce and ensure peace-keeping in Europe and even on a global level, it might represent, in the medium and long term, a return to a scenery already experienced in the past, where

*Across wide areas, the tormented, starving, overwhelmed and confused human resources stare at their cities’ and homes’ ruins and explore dark horizons, fearing a new threat, tyranny or terror. (Maclay, 2008, p.21)*

It is therefore expected that PESCO won’t result in a return to the past, but will fulfil the objective of a greater complementarity with NATO, by reinforcing the contribution of the MS to deter conflicts and also by representing greater fairness in the distribution of burdens within the area of global responsibility in the defence sphere.

It is expected that PESCO, in general, will contribute to the strengthening of European integration, which will speak with a single voice in the defence area.

Thus, as it was referred in the Portuguese Prime Minister’s comment at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, during one of the conferences on the future of Europe, on 25th January 2018, “ there is a new energy in the European Union to make progress towards a greater integration”<sup>14</sup>, but it is expected that this greater integration, also in the defence area, will result in a lasting peace.

#### **4. CONCLUSION**

The immediacy with which Europe, The United States and Canada addressed the defence issue, soon after the end of World War II, with the establishment of NATO, is not to be surprising.

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<sup>12</sup>See interview. Available on:< <http://sakerlatam.es/geopolitica/manlio-dinucci-a-arte-da-guerra-nasce-a-pesco-da-costela-da-nato/> >.

<sup>13</sup>Values and principles upheld by NATO and EU: freedom, democracy and respect for universal human rights, the rule of law and respect for the UN Charter principles (Charter of the United Nations Organisation).

<sup>14</sup> See full content. Available on: <<https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc21/comunicacao/noticia?i=uniao-europeia-tem-uma-nova-energia-para-avancar-para-uma-maior-integracao> >.

What happened with the succession of the two great world conflicts, during which the advance in technology is shown as a consequence of weapon development and improvement in the broad sense, could not be overlooked by those who, over a time span of nearly twenty years, were involved in far-reaching armed conflicts.

What we are witnessing today, in terms of the instrumentalisation for the defence and the security of the EU, is the elapsing of time and space in which the transformed global structures lead the power to show evidence that it might change hands, in which the own flexible global structures along with the information technology, allow societies to play the game of musical chairs in the hierarchy of power and enables speeches, once friendlier and more thoughtful- or were they more diplomatic- to emit a more scorching and bitter tone in the light of the hegemony.

The EU felt the need to structure and assert itself worldwide as a power capable of co-operating with internal and external defence and security, by serving its citizens, but also by cooperating with other global organisations for the world peace, through the integration of its MS, which also felt this need, since the eyes are no longer attentive to Europe, but look towards other continents.

The plan for the construction of a defence structure had to allow time for the creation of EU, this integration of people who defend the same values and principles, where the dream of some has become the reality of millions and now, it turns also into the reality of a PESCO, so that EU, since Europe can't be seen without this Union, even though there's a Brexit, does its part against violence, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and other crimes that undermine the security of the communities which long for peace.

For being both a recent structure and instrumentalisation, the MS are still being incorporated in the context of PESCO, as has happened with Portugal, with its integration in December 2017. The path for the security and defence in the EU is open and in progress, though with criticisms. The policies integrated in this sector are being implemented, being now a matter of waiting for the following steps of this journey.

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