

## **The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations**

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### **ABSTRACT**

Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* presents an outright denial of the Cartesian thinking soul substance. He shows that the inner – outer dichotomy is due to a misapprehension of our language. For the later Wittgenstein nothing is hidden. In this context this paper shows how Wittgenstein does away with the personal pronoun 'I.' He shows that the word 'I' has a totally unique grammar which is irreducible to any other. The unique use of the personal pronoun 'I' is discussed entirely from the perspective of language and grammar in the *Investigations*. The 'I' does not signify an ego or owner of experiences in 'I am in pain', any more than the word 'pain' denotes a private sensation. It is a pseudo-statement that cannot be judged to be true or false and contextual reference in such cases is to be noted. Wittgenstein characterizes the uses of first-person present tense psychological sentences like "I am in pain" as avowals (*Äußerung*), meaning expressions, manifestations, being substitutes for natural expressions like cries, smiles, grimaces. According to Wittgenstein I simply have the sensations—I do not observe or perceive them as my own and any talk of an 'inner realm' can only be in a metaphorical sense. In this context this paper discusses the concept of the thinking self as presented in *Philosophical Investigations*.

### **Introduction**

It is well known that the paramount importance in the history of modern philosophy, starting from Descartes has been ascribed to the certainty of the subject of experiences. According to Descartes the starting point of all philosophy is the *cogito* or the ego, whose existence is indubitable. Descartes' dualism gave rise to the inner-outer dichotomy, according to which the human mind is a private world to which only the subject has privileged access and is distinct from a public physical world comprising matter. Hume gave us the 'bundle' theory and famously pointed out that I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure and I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. Kant on the other hand, said "I = the unity of all representations". Wittgenstein's sustained attack against this basic foundation of modern philosophy may be called 'the swim against the tide'. For Wittgenstein 'nothing is hidden'. He repudiates the idea that the concepts of thought, feeling, intention, belief,

expectation, willing and others belong to an inner private realm to which only the individual possessing them has privileged access. First person present tense psychological utterances, like 'I have a pain', 'I expect that ...', 'I hope that ...', are not reports or descriptions of inner, private, hidden on-goings.

### **Section 1 The Inner-Outer**

The prevalent view is that the subject of experience has access to his 'inner' mental objects which is 'hidden' from others. While I can directly observe the contents of my own mind, others can only surmise based on my behaviour and other external manifestations. So the content of my experience is 'private' which is inaccessible to any other being. This picture shows that we have perceptual access to the contents of our own world of consciousness. In that case it may be argued that the subject has essentially a private language to refer to his private sensations. For if it is not a private language but a common one, the claim of such sensations and contents being 'inner' and hidden will not stand. But at the same time if I am to refer to my 'innermost' experiences and wish that others should understand me, I am obviously using a common language, following a rule to enable a common understanding of the words and expressions referring to 'my sensations' alone (unless I use a common language, I cannot be understood by others). But the paradox lies in the fact that in that case the common language cannot refer to something that is essentially 'mine'. If I am to be understood not only by others but also by myself when speaking about my 'inner self', the possibility of a private language is ruled out. Hence the 'inner self' is a misconstruction of our language; nothing can be hidden and a public, common language is used to refer to psychological concepts. Wittgenstein has given the beetle argument to show the impossibility of a private language.<sup>1</sup> Everybody is given a box with something inside it which is to be the meaning of the word 'beetle' for that person. No one has access to anybody else's box; in fact, even if the boxes were empty no one would know. In this situation if they talk of 'beetle' it cannot be about what is in their boxes. On similar grounds, if psychological predicates like 'pain' refer to each person's private matters, no one would be able to understand and there would be no common meaning of the word at all. That there are common meanings shows that a private language is not possible. If we do not use the kind of language that we do use, then our words would be different and meanings would be different. But this by no chance establishes the priority of psychological terms as referring to private sense-data. That there is a common meaning for the word 'pain', *by means of which we are able to communicate*, establishes the fact that it is not the name of a private sensation.

The traditional belief about privileged access to the contents of our own private world of consciousness i.e., the 'inner' to which no one else can have access to implied that we can only infer about the contents of other people's minds based on observation of external manifestations. So the question of doubt never arises in my case but does in the case of other people, because the

possibility remains that others could be pretending or shamming, for example, of pain. According to Wittgenstein this belief in the mind as a realm of hidden and ethereal entities, states and processes is due to a misapprehension of our language. The 'inner' facade is nothing but an illusion. In the *PI*, he writes:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states about behaviourism arise? — The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better ... So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium.<sup>2</sup>

We generally tend to suppose that the term 'I' in first person utterances refers to some entity since the third person utterances are about somebody. It is also held that 'I' in sentences like 'I have a fair complexion'; 'I am six-foot tall' refers to my body and not to an immaterial soul. In utterances like 'I am out of gas'; 'I collided with a pillar box', 'I' stands not for my body but for the car in which I am travelling. But first-person psychological utterances like 'I have toothache', 'I am depressed' do not refer to my body.<sup>3</sup> In such cases the term 'I' is not replaceable by the term 'my body'. So who is this 'I'? Wittgenstein says: 'I is not the name of a person, nor "here" of a place, and "this" is not a name'.<sup>4</sup> Ashok Vohra points out the term 'I' does not have a stable referent. It only has a shifting referent. 'I' indicates me in my use of it; when you use it, it indicates you. So because of its changing referent, we may call it an 'index word'. Vohra opines: "So 'I' is not the name of a mysterious, concealed substance. The 'I' has a meaning and location within the contingencies of everyday experience. That is, 'I' turns up along with the world in concrete living. This 'I' can never be netted as an object because it is exhibited as I in company with events and things as they ordinarily occur ... but is something that is continually being manifested neither as an object, nor as a little 'world', but as something that accompanies the world. One cannot know 'I' or mind or self in isolation from the world. On the contrary, one knows it when one knows about the world".<sup>5</sup>

According to Wittgenstein first-person present tense psychological statements like 'I have a pain', 'I expect that', 'I hope that', etc. do not report or describe inner, private on-goings. Actually the problem arises because of the asymmetry between first-person present tense psychological utterances and third-person present tense psychological utterances. Despite the asymmetry, the first-person present tense utterances do not enjoy any special privileged position; this is the point made by Wittgenstein time and again. When a man cries out in pain, there is nothing behind the cry, or 'nothing is hidden' in Wittgensteinian language. The idea of 'epistemic privacy' is repudiated by Wittgenstein, according to which only I can know that I am in pain, while others can at best surmise. One cannot be mistaken nor can one misperceive one's

own pain. When I say that I know that I am in pain, I am saying something which is nonsense or just emphatically asserting that I *am* in pain. At the same time, in the ordinary sense of ‘know’ others may, and often do, know that I am in pain. Moreover, the sufferer does not know directly or indirectly of his being in pain, he simply suffers it. Others know of his pain by seeing him moan and writhe. We don’t make an inference to the fact that he is in pain, we *see* that he is suffering.

## **Section 2 Avowals**

Wittgenstein says expressions like “I see”, “I hear”, “I am conscious” have their uses.<sup>6</sup> They are avowals which are a common translation of *Äußerung* or *Ausdruck* or *Äusserungen* the English alternative terms being ‘expression’, ‘manifestation’. They are substitutes for natural expressions like cries, grimaces, and smiles. Avowals typically are not used to convey information whereas third-person present tense psychological utterances are generally informative and based on observation unlike the former. In the *Philosophical Investigations (Henceforth to be referred as PI)* he writes “A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour ... the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.”<sup>7</sup> So avowals like ‘I have a pain’, ‘I have a toothache’, are not descriptions. Verbal expressions like ‘I have a pain’ replaces the moans, the cries, which are natural expressions of pain. But when we refer to others we say ‘He has a pain’ or ‘He has a toothache’ which are descriptions. The difference in the two grammatical levels tends to make us suppose that the self-ascription of psychological predicates is to be explained differently from those that are ascribed to others. Consequently, we tend to imagine ‘inner’ objects for explaining psychological predicates which are nothing but “grammatical fiction”. When a man moans and writhes in pain and says ‘I am in pain’, there is nothing behind the utterance or the moaning. But the problem arises because a person could be faking the moaning. Despite the probability of counterfeit cases, it is absurd to suppose that there is anything behind the manifestations of pain. It is simply that I *have* pain.

Consider the following:

In what sense are my sensations *private*? —well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. —Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself! —It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I *am* in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations *only* from my behaviour—for *I* cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.<sup>8</sup>

So in my case I have pain and it makes no sense to doubt it. This is reminiscent of the early transition years, where Wittgenstein had said the proposition 'I have a toothache' cannot be verified because that is the end of verification. Now Wittgenstein is saying that I do not learn that I am in pain, I simply have pain. This 'having pain' does not denote anything beyond it but is all in all, it is the pain. As a result, the question 'How do you know that you are in pain?' is nonsense. Earlier Wittgenstein had said that 'I have' and 'He has' are on two different grammatical levels and 'He has...' is open to verification. Now he is saying there is the possibility of doubt in 'He has pain' but not when I say 'I have pain'. There is a difference between the two cases, however slight it may be which may be said to grant avowals a different standing from third-person utterances. Wittgenstein is in favour of considering contextual reference to remove such doubt and the possibility of shamming.

Wittgenstein points out that if pain is a private sensation then it could be possible that other people are shamming pain-behaviour; where nothing has happened he may be walking around and displaying as if he is in great pain. Moreover, an added possibility would also be that we could imagine inanimate objects like stones having pains.<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein says that we do often speak of inanimate things, as in fairy tales, of having sensations, but these are secondary uses. To overcome such difficulties Wittgenstein speaks of taking contexts into considerations. For example, we do not doubt that a man is pretending to be in pain when he is lying in a pool of blood and moaning. Manifestation of what we call pain behaviour together with the context helps us to determine whether "He is in pain". The criterion of saying "He is in pain" and the like is subject to change with the changes in the situation and the context and the same may also be said of "I am in pain". So at times we may be certain, at other times doubtful in our application of psychological predicates to others. If we merely conceive doubt to know that another person is in pain, we could easily construct doubt for anything else, like  $2+2=4$ , like the case of the malignant demon of Descartes. But according to Wittgenstein, doubt must have an end.<sup>10</sup>

Wittgenstein answers negatively to the general supposition that sensations are incommunicable or inalienable. If 'pain' is a private sensation which is known or felt only by the person having it, then I may never know what it is to say that another person has a pain. But we often do know with certainty that 'He is in pain', for example after a surgery. If 'pain' denotes a private sensation, known only by me and present to me in the depths of my consciousness, 'pain-talk' in case of others becomes unintelligible. Moreover, it is nonsensical to say that I have a pain which

is going on all the while but I do not feel it because that would be a self-contradiction. So it is not possible that there is a pain which I feel and no one else can feel and also that there is a pain which I do not feel but another person has. I can know when others are in pain and others can equally know whether I am in pain. According to Wittgenstein there is no logical absurdity in supposing that one can in principle feel pain in another's body. For Wittgenstein it is possible that another person might be able to feel a pain in my body or I may feel pain in another person's body. (Of course this sounds ridiculous but we may suppose that the two bodies are wired in connection).

In the *PI* he writes:

In so far as it makes *sense* to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain. (And it would also be imaginable for two people to feel pain in the same – not just the corresponding – place. That might be the case with Siamese twins, for instance.)<sup>11</sup>

So a pain as long as I could feel it, would be mine, no matter in whose body it occurs. So the question of 'privacy' of pain is ruled out. We tend to suppose that the statement "I can't feel your pain" is the same sort as "I can't put your shoes on". But here we are making a mistake because the former one is not an empirical statement which is verifiable by facts of experience unlike the latter. Rather it is equivalent to propositions like 'I can't play patience with you.'<sup>12</sup> It shows logical impossibilities. But according to Wittgenstein there is no logical absurdity in supposing that one can in principle feel pain in another's body.

A.C. Grayling points out that there are not two sets of rules that govern the ascription of psychological predicates, one to myself and the other to others. I definitely can determine whether someone else is in pain only on the basis of his behaviour but this should go hand-in-hand with my grasping of the rules for the use of the word "pain". Grayling points out that this is not any kind of a behaviourist theory. For Wittgenstein, the behavioural signs of groaning, whining in pain are only criteria for application of the word "pain" and he does not say that the meaning of pain consists in a set of bodily signs.<sup>13</sup>

Wittgenstein is arguing against the view that pain can be a private sensation. If pain is a private sensation, then how can we say of another person that he has what I have or had on a previous occasion? (We do often say 'He has a pain that I have'). If pain is to be identified by being unique to someone then 'I have pain' and 'He has pain' would be analogically the same as 'It is 5 o'clock in Calcutta' and 'It is 5 o'clock on the sun'. But we cannot say that it is 5 o'clock on the sun in the same sense as it is 5 o'clock here, because being 5 o'clock on the sun does not have the same meaning and is not used in the same manner as being 5 o'clock at a place on earth. When I say 'He has pain', what I mean is that I can imagine his pain as being similar to mine. If

we are to talk and effect a successful communication about our sensations like 'pain', then they must have meanings which can be understood by others and anything private that may accompany such sensations is beside the point.

Therefore, Severin Schroeder points out: firstly, identity of a private experience, e.g., 'pain' is immaterial in our public communication about it. And secondly pain is not a private experience because the meaning of the word 'pain' is not determined by the identity of a private experience.<sup>14</sup> Severin Schroeder points out that the difficulty Wittgenstein is highlighting here is how to move from 'There is a pain' to 'He is in pain'. It is a contradiction in terms to suppose that someone else can have what I have i.e. 'pain'. Therefore, Schroeder says "what is required to make sense of the assumption that someone else is in pain is not having experienced pain oneself. It is not the pain needs, but the *concept* of pain (Z 547-8). And a grasp of this concept includes an understanding of what it means to ascribe pain to a particular person. One must know, in brief, that 'the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression' (PI §302)".<sup>15</sup> The whole meaning of the word 'pain' is jettisoned in the natural expressions and natural responses that the word sets in us. People who are not using it in the way we do (imagine aliens from a distant planet) would not know anything by the word 'pain' and would not behave in the manner we do in case of pain-behaviour.

### **Section 3 Personal Identity**

For Wittgenstein the criteria for identifying people cannot be an exclusive single criterion; it could consist of physical appearance, habits, behaviour, etc. David Backhurst points out: "Rather, the term 'person' has a 'composite' use, governed by many overlapping criteria. Moreover, that we can deploy such criteria—that we have the concept of personhood we do—depends on certain contingent facts, such as the fact that a person's appearance and characteristic ways of behaving tend to change only very slowly. Were circumstances different, Wittgenstein attests, our practices of naming and identification would likely be different too ... Our very idea of discrete persons who persist through time is thus premised upon certain contingent facts."<sup>16</sup> The use of the terms 'person' and 'personality' is a matter of judgment. So there is no single criterion of personal identity either in terms of psychological or bodily factors; no strict necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood. It generally appears that the term 'I' is immune to referential failure nor can it mischaracterize the intention of the utterance. I do not mistake myself for anyone when I say 'I am in pain', for example. As compared to other personal pronouns, there is no presupposition involved in the use of 'I' of "identifying the referent through a name or description, or through a deictic gesture".<sup>17</sup>

The term 'I' does not serve to identify someone; 'I' is not used to pick myself out from a group of people or things. The term 'I' can be used by anyone and its use can be understood by anyone

without knowledge of any other identifying features. So for Wittgenstein, 'I' does not serve any identifying function, not even in cases of communication. David Backhurst points out 'I' is an indexical like 'this', 'that', 'here', 'now' and since there is no criteria of identification in the latter cases, 'I' should also be considered on the same lines. Backhurst argues: "But why not conclude that 'I' is a super-referring expression? If attempting to refer to something is like firing an arrow at a target, we can think of 'I' as a magic arrow that cannot miss. Wittgenstein rebuts this suggestion. Using 'I' is more like drawing a target around an arrow already stuck in the wall. Where a term is used to refer, some work must be done to pick out a particular object. This is not so with the use of 'I', and thus, Wittgenstein concludes, we should not think of it as a referring expression at all."<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, according to Wittgenstein 'I' is not a referring expression and first-person psychological utterances are neither descriptions nor reports of inner states. H.J. Glock is however of the opinion that the issue of whether 'I' is a referring expression depends on the use of the term 'referring', which has not been adequately discussed by Wittgenstein. The term 'I' helps to determine the sense of the propositions in which it occurs by saying about whom the proposition is about (like in 'I broke a vase', I say who did it), but it is different from other referring expressions in its contribution.<sup>19</sup> David Backhurst is of the opinion that just because 'I' does not serve as a device for singling out a person when one is thinking, we need not conclude that 'I' does not refer for two reasons. First, no thinker is alone in the world. The first-person pronoun is part of a public language and in communicative contexts the function of 'I' is (at least in some sense) to indicate the individual who is speaking. Second, the first-person pronoun is deployed in the expression of thoughts, feelings and desires, and if I am to express myself I must, as it were, establish a first-personal perspective. There is an indexicality to this perspective that cannot be eliminated. It is *mine*. Of course, I recognize an equivalence between the statement, 'I am giving a lecture', said by me, and statement, 'David Backhurst is giving a lecture', said by anyone. But I recognize the equivalence only because I accept as true a further indexical thought—that I am David Backhurst. If the first-person pronoun is a critical ingredient in articulating such first-personal thoughts, then its use has a purpose, and one not somehow undermined by its immunity to referential error."<sup>20</sup>

Wittgenstein is emphatic in his denial of the self or subject of thinking and his resistance of the 'I' as an owner is continuous.

#### **Section 4 Wittgenstein and Behaviourism**

It has often been charged that Wittgenstein endorses a version of behaviourism. Although many scholars have repudiated this allegation. Wittgenstein's views are very abstruse and knotty in this respect. Of course he does not equate thinking and behaviour as Skinner has done. Rather his



enquiry is a grammatical one. The middle Wittgenstein did give a behaviourist account of third-person psychological statements like 'N.N. is sad'. Knowledge of such propositions is to be based on behavioural evidence, considering that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification. Therefore, the ascription of psychological predicates to others is to talk of their behaviour. But how does one verify a proposition like 'I am sad'? Such a proposition cannot be verified by observing one's behaviour. In the transitional phase Wittgenstein said that such propositions can be translated as 'There is sadness' where the 'I' does not denote an owner. The mature Wittgenstein went on to say that first person present tense utterances are not descriptions of any kind. Rather they are avowals and do not express behaviour. And in such cases the contextual reference as to be noted to overcome the possibility of shamming or faking. For example, some expressions may be considered as manifestations of sadness on one occasion but not in another. Moore's account of Wittgenstein's lectures shows that by the early 1930's Wittgenstein had cognized that first-person present tense psychological utterances stand apart from others in the sense that verificationism is not applicable to them. I cannot verify for example that I feel pain; I feel hot or I am sad. But such sentences are nevertheless meaningful. Behaviourism rejected the inner criteria of verifying one's own first-person declarations with mental states. Rather it recommended comparing them with one's own behaviour. This was unilaterally rejected by Wittgenstein. In the early 1930's he writes: If I say I believe that someone is sad, it's as though I am seeing his behaviour through the medium of sadness, from the viewpoint of sadness. But could you say: 'It looks to me as if I'm sad, my head is drooping so'?<sup>21</sup> Moore's lecture notes also testify this: ... In this connection he said later, first, that the meaning of 'verification' is different when we speak of verifying 'I have' from what it is when we speak of verifying 'He has', and then, later still, that there is no such thing as a verification for 'I have', since the question 'How do you know that you have a toothache?' is nonsensical. He criticized two answers which might be given to this last question by people who do think it is not nonsensical, by saying (1) that the answer 'Because I feel it' won't do, because 'I feel it' means the same as 'I have it', and (2) that the answer 'I know it by inspection also won't do, because it implies that I can 'look to see' whether I have it or not, whereas 'looking to see whether I have it or not' has no meaning.<sup>22</sup>

Glock points out, for Wittgenstein, the ascription of psychological predicates to other people is logically connected with their behaviour. But the connection is not of logical equivalence between propositions that are psychological and those that are behavioural. Rather it should be kept in mind that it is sensible to ascribe mental phenomena only to creatures who can manifest them and psychological terms make sense only where they are bound up with some behaviour, no matter how diverse. For example, "if we came across human beings who used a word which lacked any connection with pain—behaviour and the circumstances in which we display it, we could not translate it as pain". Glock points out "the relationship between mental phenomena and

their behavioural manifestations is not a causal one to be discovered empirically, through theory and induction, but a criterial one: it is part of the concepts of particular mental phenomena that they have a characteristic manifestation in behaviour... And it is part of mental concepts in general that they have some such manifestation.”<sup>23</sup>

It is true that the criteria for the description of psychological predicates except in cases of self-ascription are behaviour. For such ascriptions are based on observations of behavioural manifestation. Yet Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist in the sense that he insisted that words like ‘pain’, ‘joy’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’ stand for forms of behaviour. Sentences with psychological predicates are not always about behaviour neither do they stand for states or processes that cause behaviour. Wittgenstein’s approach seems vulnerable to behaviourism because the use of psychological predicates for others can only be based on behavioural criteria. We can observe only the behaviour of others and nothing else. But the use of such predicates in case of oneself is not based on observation of one’s own behaviour. Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist in the sense of insisting that the words like ‘pain’, ‘joy’, ‘intention’, ‘belief’, ‘thought’ stand for forms of behaviour.

In answer to the question that there is no pain without *pain* behaviour, Wittgenstein replies that only of a living human being and what resembles and behaves like one can we say that it has sensations, sees, hears, is deaf, conscious or unconscious.<sup>24</sup>

Wittgenstein, although he recognizes the distinction between propositions about physical behaviour and propositions about psychological phenomena, does not explain them in terms of the inner-outer picture. Rather, for him, the differences lie in the use of the terms in the language games they occur.

Hark points out the question ‘How can we verify what another person thinks?’ cannot be answered by empirical facts because it is not an empirical question at all. “The question is answered by describing the rules for psychological judgments about another person’s thoughts and hence is conceptual. That there are no definite (behavioural) criteria for establishing that another person feels pain, feigns pain or is thinking of a divorce while reading a book, is not an empirical shortcoming analogous to our being unable to enter a room in order to check whether there is a person there or our inability to discover the (viral) cause of a disease.”<sup>25</sup>

Wittgenstein has argued against behaviourism and has attempted to make the point that the use and meaning of psychological terms do not refer to inner states. ‘I am in pain’ is a natural expression of pain and does not describe an inner state. Wittgenstein does not, like Ryle, maintain that a person knows about his or her own mental states on the basis of observing behaviour. But he does accept that attribution of mental states to other people is definitely on the

basis of behavioural criteria. Hence, our psychological judgments of other people do have room for error. Wittgenstein's point is the claim that one cannot know another person's thoughts directly but can only surmise them, refers to a logical impossibility and not a physical impossibility.

Wittgenstein's view of thinking and speaking is opposed to both behaviourist and cognitive science approaches. With them he agrees that thinking is intimately related to speaking. But how they are related has not been specified. "Talking is the *expression* of thought"<sup>26</sup>, as pointed out by Robert L. Arrington. Wittgenstein obviously did not equate thinking to behaviour unlike BF Skinner. Rather Wittgenstein's enquiry is a grammatical one. Thinking may be expressed in behaviour but the two are not identical. Behaviour is a process unlike thinking. Psychological vocabulary is not used 'in order to comprehend, predict, explain and manipulate the behaviour of humans'. Vocabulary has myriad uses and is a part of human life itself. Although we do also read human behaviour by reference to their desires, intentions, purposes and goals.

Wittgenstein is therefore disputing the behaviourists' claim that psychological terms refer and are to be analysed in terms of actual behaviour. The inner-outer dichotomy is thrashed out by Wittgenstein. According to him present tense psychological utterances like 'I am in pain' are not descriptions of an inner state but akin to natural expressions like cries, grimaces, i.e., avowals. According to Wittgenstein I never identify my sensation by criteria. I simply have a pain, a toothache. In case of other people, the ascription of such predicates is done on the basis of behavioural criteria. But I do not apply psychological predicates to myself on the basis of my behaviour. I do not observe from my behaviour that I have a toothache. I simply have it. The word 'I' in 'I am in pain' instead of being used to refer to someone or picking out someone among others, is used to draw attention to *myself*.

So personal identity is not to be established on the basis of behavioural criteria. The identity of a person can be established in diverse ways. Therefore, Wittgenstein gives a powerful case against behavioural criteria for oneself. And the behavioural criteria for other persons are diverse, involving a number of factors like situation, custom, usage, etc.

## **CONCLUSION:**

The *PI* shows that the word "I" has a totally unique grammar, which is irreducible to any other. The unique use of the personal pronoun "I" is discussed entirely from the perspective of language and grammar in the *PI*. The 'I' does not signify an ego or owner of experiences in "I am in pain", any more than the word "pain" denotes a private sensation. It is a pseudo-statement that cannot be judged to be true or false and contextual reference in such cases is to be noted. Wittgenstein characterizes the uses of first-person present tense psychological sentences like "I

am in pain” as avowals (*Äußerung*), meaning expressions, manifestations, being substitutes for natural expressions like cries, smiles, grimaces. According to Wittgenstein I simply have the sensations—I do not observe or perceive them as my own. And any talk of an ‘inner realm’ can only be in a metaphorical sense. One may deduce that Wittgenstein was committed to the task of demonstrating a non-existent thinking subject.

The ‘ultimate’ Wittgenstein makes a purely grammatical probe of the thinking self. He concludes that what we are accustomed to call the thinking self cannot be pinned down to one such substantive entity. Rather, the term ‘I’ as signifying the thinking self is also used as a part of our language, and depending on the way we are using our language, there are a great many criteria for personal identity. So we find the ‘ultimate’ Wittgenstein linking language with our everyday activities and his philosophical enquiry is covered, only in language. It is a fascinating exposition and perhaps this is what glorifies Wittgenstein to this day.

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