

CHANGING ROLE OF YOUTH IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have found that since 1970s countries with a large proportion of working age population have less chances of maintaining their democratic gains. Cincotta (2008) and many others argue that a country's chances of meaningful democracy increase as its population matures. This is because when a high percentage of adolescent population enters the workforce it leads to increased unemployment, which in turn, affects political stability of the country. Further, these unemployed youths become a hot pursuit for rebel groups, as they are easy to mobilize and recruit. Hence, the likelihood of internal disorder increases which threatens democratic functioning of the country.

There is ample proof in the literature about youth bulges leading to political violence, even more organized forms of political violence like internal armed conflicts (Zakaria 2001; Urdal 2008; Urdal 2004; Huntington 1996; Kaplan 1994). Zakaria (2001) argues that youth bulges along with small economic and social change have been the principal cause of Islamic resurgence in Arab world. Lichbach (1995) points out young people are generally students and do not face high opportunity cost of foregone wages. Young people are more geographically concentrated as they visit similar places (Eckert and Willems 1986; Lichbach 1995). Thus, youth groups face very low opportunity and transaction costs associated with collective action. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Urdal (2004, 2008) also argue that presence of large youth cohorts is a potential cause of civil war as they provide a big pool of recruits for rebel organizations.

Despite these long held beliefs about the negative effects of youth bulge on political stability, there has come up a new body of literature who do not find young people as a threatening factor. For developing countries there is a growing divergence both in demographic and conflict patterns (Sciubba 2012). Population trends by themselves are neither good nor bad, but they at times aid or abate situations of internal peace or conflict to which states must respond. Sciubba (2012) iterates that the bonus of having a large working age population can be wasted if there are

not enough employment opportunities or also due to poor health and lack of education skills.. On similar lines, this paper proposes that youth bulge does not always become a potential factor to support collective action. Precisely it depends on the policy response whether a population trend will turn out to be a boon or a bane for the country

There should be a willingness for collective action. No opportunity is ripe enough without a willingness. Young generation will be more susceptible to collective action as they are less accommodative than the older generations (Huntington 1968). They are the ones most disappointed by poor living conditions or due to lack of educational and employment opportunities (Urdal 2004, 2008). In absence of basic provisions from government, youth groups have willingness to mobilize and resolve their collective action problems. Lichbach (1995) argues that youth groups can solve the rebel's dilemma of non-participation easier than other groups. Therefore, we argue that if and only if willingness is present, youth groups can provide a potential opportunity for collective action, and not otherwise.

Using the data on 29 Indian states from 2001-2012, this article finds results contradictory to the established belief about youth bulge. India has a large proportion of population in the transitional age group (working age group). Rather than experiencing internal unrest, in the last decade or so India has achieved reasonable amount of economic growth. Further, analysis presented in this paper shows that in situation where a state has high percentage of population in the age group of 15-24, the chance of collective violence decreases significantly, provided there is no identifiable motivational factor present. On the other hand, this particular age group becomes quite a threat when mixed with poor educational opportunities or bad living standards. This challenges our long held belief regarding the negative effects of youth bulge per se. Similar stories can also be said about Brazil and South Africa, who has could achieve decent economic growth with a population whose median age ranges between 25 and 29 years, respectively. These examples warrant researchers to revisit the debate regarding the negative effects of youth bulge. The second section reviews relevant literature. Section 3 is a discussion on data and methodology followed by section 4 on data analyses. Fifth section concludes.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Lichbach (1998) contends that opportunities or willingness do not change the decision calculus of rebels. In order to see how the structural and political conditions and the willingness for change affect (non) participation of individuals one should look at the politics between the rebels and the state. In the contest between state and rebel, whoever can resolve the non-participation problem wins. According to him, both state and rebel organization face similar problems of collective action. The members of state (as a group) and dissident organization can choose to

free-ride, because maintaining the status quo or overthrowing it is after all a public good and hence, both groups need ways to resolve their dilemmas. The structural and political opportunities become instrumental in helping one or the other resolve the dilemma and ensure collective action. The author, here, contends that institutional structure of the state and motivation for dissent must interact with each other while facilitating rebel groups to apply some solutions to their collective actions problems.

The solutions to non-participation problem are essentially based on two dimensions – deliberative and ontological (Lichbach 1995). First dimension assumes that participants in a collective action may or may not discuss their situations with others thereby leading to planned or unplanned social order. On the other hand, ontologically one can assume whether the participant is an individual, a group or an institution or relationships pre-exist individuals and groups resulting in spontaneous or contingent order. Market solutions assume that individuals who do not engage in social planning create solutions to collective action problem which are unplanned and spontaneous like, increasing benefits to the participants, lowering transaction and opportunity costs faced by dissidents, increasing available resources, increasing the probability of winning, and many more. Contract solutions also ontologically assume individuals as the key actor, but actors plan with each other to forge contracts.¹

Scholars suggest it becomes easier for youth groups to resolve their non-participation problems both deliberatively (unplanned and spontaneous) and/or ontologically (planned and spontaneous). Young people can act individually in a planned or unplanned manner. For instance, absence or lack of educational or employment opportunities in poor countries lower the opportunity cost of the young people for participating in a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Lichbach 1995). In addition, young people are generally students and do not face high opportunity cost of foregone wages (Lichbach 1995). At the same time, young people can plan to self-govern themselves without the help of any pre-existing organization. This is because young people visit similar places like universities, youth clubs, gyms, study groups, etc. The geographic concentration shared by young people reduces the transaction costs of collective action (Eckert and Willems 1986; Lichbach 1995). Hence, one can confidently assume that young people and their groups have potential to disrupt political order.

Young generation will always be more susceptible to collective action as they are less accommodative than the older generations (Huntington 1968). They are the ones who are most disappointed by poor living conditions or lack of educational and employment opportunities (Urdal 2004, 2008). There is ample evidence in the literature that large youth cohorts are a potent

¹ For more discussion on solution to rebel's dilemma refer to Lichbach (1995).

source of internal unrest in any society (Choucri 1974; Moller 1968; Zakaria 2001; Hughes 1997; Urdal 2004, 2008). These authors argue that youth bulges put pressure on social institutions like labor market and educational system, which, in turn, results in severe grievances leading to violent conflict. Although it had been stressed for a long time by scholars (Choucri 1974; Moller 1968) that large youth cohorts can lead to political violence, the issue has received much attention in the recent decades (Urdal 2008). For instance, Zakaria (2001) argues post 9/11 that youth bulges have been main cause for rise of Islamic nationalism and political instability in the Arab world, as they provide source for potential recruits to the terrorist organizations. This has been further corroborated by the recent uprisings in the Middle East, i.e., the Arab Awakening. Further, a large part of the argument presented about clash of civilizations by Huntington (1996) assumes that increasing population belonging to the young generation would lead to more violence. Huntington (1968) substantiates this argument in his book *The Political Order of Changing Societies* when he points out that it is the second generation of the rural farmers who migrated to urban areas, i.e. the *lumpen proletariat*, who are potential source of unrest in the cities. In nutshell, the conventional wisdom is that larger share of population in younger generations is not good for the political stability of the country. But the question here is: why would they do that? What is the motivation to forge such groups, mobilize, organize and engage in collective action?

Tilly (1978) argues that zealots exist when the marginal benefits of someone's participation in a collective action exceeds his marginal cost. So, if the demand for the good sought for is very intense amongst the youth group then they would be willing to take such risks. Gurr (1970) points to the social and psychological conditions that make people unhappy with their political establishments and that dispose them to use force to pursue what they want. Gurr (1970) argues that rather than absolute levels of deprivations, feelings of relative deprivation are stronger in leading to aggressive behavior among people. If there exists a perceived difference between what people think that they deserve and what they can actually get, the likelihood for rebellion increases. The intensity and scope of relative deprivation strongly determine potential for collective violence. Angry and frustrated people are more likely to commit violence and are also more receptive to arguments that violence will help to redress their present situation.

Davies (1965) also argues that people will rebel or join any on-going rebellion if they feel that there exists a gap between their aspiration and their actual objective conditions. He pointed out that a failed dream is much more dangerous than the dream which has not been pursued. He argues that people are most agitated right after there is a slump in their objective conditions. When a country is developing, people start dreaming of improvement in their conditions. Under such situations of prosperity, the expectations of people are sky high. If for some reason there is a downturn in the improvement curve of the populace, it creates a huge gap between people's

expectations and their actual material conditions. These aggrieved people, who suddenly experience a slump in their growth process, are most dangerous and most likely to rise in rebellion. Again, less government accommodation of the demands of rebel groups can also be a reason of frustration and, therefore, should be associated with more collective violence (Lichbach 1994, 1995). Hence, it can be assumed that unavailability of basic facilities is viewed as indifference from the government side, where it is believed that governments can perform better.

Although there exists enough evidence in literature on youth bulge as an opportunity, there is very little to almost nothing on how and why this opportunity is created and activated. Lichbach (1998) points out that structure specific or action oriented explanation of contentious politics are largely insufficient in themselves. While the former is strong in providing the context within which action occurs, but does not offer an explanation as to how these structure or institutions could shape the concrete interests and preferences of the actors; the latter remains inadequate in explaining how the interests and preferences of the actors are formed or originate in the first place. On the other hand, relative deprivation arguments provide the motivational aspect of rebellions, but does not show how such motivations lead to collective violence to ameliorate the conditions of the people or under what situations such motivations find a vent for collective violence. As a matter of fact, in recent times, some scholars have found that youth groups are not a potent factor in collective action. Costello, Jenkins and Aly (2015) in their analysis of the Arab Awakening did not find youth bulge as a significant predictor of violent or non-violent protests. They suggest that economic squeeze felt by young adults was not a motivating factor leading to unrest in the region. Their study contends that overall economic grievances are less important than political grievances, even amongst the younger generations.

These contradictory findings necessitate a closer examination of this variable – whether or not young adults are a serious threat to internal security of a country. At the same time, with the objective of developing “nice laws” this paper proposes a solution that would integrate both the opportunity and willingness of collective action and explain how this interaction effectively reduces (non) participation problems of the rebel groups by facilitating solutions to their dilemmas.

In this paper, we argue that opportunity is not enough in resolving rebel’s dilemma; there should be potential source of grievances which make any opportunity favorable or inclined to collective action. The author argues that youth group becomes an opportunity for collective action if and only if there is a willingness to act. If there are grievances due to poor basic facilities, one should expect more collective action from youth groups. On the other hand, if there are no grievances/willingness, one should expect less/ no collective action from youth groups.

To be borne in mind that grievances will always be there. There is no time that all will be happy. But the decision to act or not act depends on how the individual weigh the situation. The condition of relative deprivation to one may be viewed as normal condition by another. For example, absence of educational opportunity in poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa will not lead to much action. On the other hand, the same reason appears to be a potential cause of grievance and therefore, willingness to South African youth to fight the establishment. This is because, a sub-Saharan country like Somalia is still stuck at the bottom of the Maslow's needs pyramid, where the priorities are food and shelter. But South Africa has crossed that stage and reached the second tier of the needs' pyramid where education, health, security are priorities (Maslow 1943). Therefore, disaggregating the willingness or grievance variable is also very important.

At the same time, there are studies that suggest that youth bulge should not be treated as one comprehensive measure (Urdal 2006; Campante and Chor 2012). While Urdal (2006) finds the 15-24 yrs age group as more problematic, Campante and Chor (2012) argue in favor of 25-39 yrs age group. This paper attempts to further break down the youth bulge variable. According to the author, every age group has its own requirements and priorities. Grievance/ willingness vary with age-group. For example, at the age of 17 the priority is education, while at 24 the priority becomes a decent job and a good standard of living.

Using the data for 29 Indian states from 2001-2012, this paper examines the true role of youth bulge in aiding and/or retarding collective violence. India proves to be a fertile ground to test the validity of these theories concerning youth bulge. No country appears as often in the top ten ranks of various forms of conflicts and violence in most of the data archives as India (Taylor and Jodice 1983; Kinloch 1988). In the recent years, India has experienced almost all other forms of collective violence – political strikes, riots, terrorism, and assassinations. With 356 million people who are 10-24 years old, India has the highest youth population even higher than China (UNFPA 2014). Hence, India provides a worthy testing ground for opportunity-willingness argument for low-level conflicts.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The dependent variable in this analysis is an event count – *incidence of riots per year* - in each of the 29 Indian states between 2001 and 2012. The National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, India, provides this data on riots. This data is recorded by NCRB based on police reports for particular periods.

Indian Penal Code (IPC) holds rioting as a cognizable offence and hence, police can arrest without a warrant. IPC Section 141-146 states that an assembly of 5 or more persons using

exhibition of criminal force, resisting execution of law or any legal processes, committing any mischief or criminal trespass, and/ or disrupt public order by use of criminal force, will be considered “unlawful” and punishable under IPC Cognizable Crime Act (Criminal Procedure Code, Section 2c, Indian Penal Code 1980).² Under such situation, police has responsibility to take immediate action on receipt of a complaint or credible information, investigate situation, assess offender and arraign him before a court of law with jurisdiction over the matter (Crime Reports, NCRB, 2005). NCRB records the number the total number of oral, written, distress call or the ones initiated by suo-moto, complaints received by police under violent crime committed against public order involving use of criminal force by five or more people. This data has been collected by NCRB since 1999, mainly to assess the load of work for the police force. Riots and arsons are the major crimes committed against public order in India, which constitute about 3.6% of the total crimes under IPC (Crime Reports, NCRB 2005).

Variables measuring number of times an event occurs is called event count (King 1989). All such variables take the value of 0 or other positive integers. There are essentially two principles of the process generating event count: independence and homogeneity. The first principle assumes that occurrence of an event in time $t + 1$ is independent of it occurring in time t . At the same time, the second principle assumes that the rate of occurrence of events is same in all time periods under observation. But in case of the dependent variable studied here (incidence of riots each year), one can always assume a contagion effect between events in the same time period and also between two time periods. For example, riots occurring in current year are always affected by similar events of collective action in the previous year or previous month in the same year. Similarly, rates of occurrences of such events can either increase or decrease depending upon other factors. Negative binomial estimation techniques correct for the problems caused due to violation of the two principles of data generation. I add one year *lagged riots* as one of the independent variables as well. The unit of analysis here is sub-national units or Indian states.

² Definition of Rioting under IPC Section 146: “The term “riot” means a public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of, any other person or to the person of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having, individually or collectively, the ability of immediate execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other individual.

A person is guilty of riot if he participates with five or more others in a course of disorderly conduct: (a) with purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or misdemeanor; (b) with purpose to prevent or coerce official action; or (c) when the actor or any other participant to the knowledge of the actor uses or plans to use a firearm or other deadly weapon.

A riot is an unlawful assembly. It is only the use of force that distinguishes rioting from an unlawful assembly.”

Independent Variables

The effect of *youth bulges* on civil violence at the sub-national level would be tested in two ways – individually and interacted with a measure of grievance. I would measure youth bulge as the percentage of population belonging to three age groups – 15-19, 20-24 and 25-39. The data for percentage of youth population for each age group in each state is taken from Indiastat³. However, since literature shows that youth groups are more potential source of low-level internal armed conflicts (Zakaria 2001), we should expect that the substantive effect of this variable should be stronger at sub-national level when the dependent variable is riots and not civil wars.

As mentioned in the previous section, the alternate hypothesis in this analysis is that young people are not a threat by themselves. There should be serious motivational factors that turn these young boys and girls into militants. According to IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2016), India's GDP growth rate in 2015 was 7.33% and was considered as ninth fastest growing nation of the world. Seven Indian states have economy over USD 100 billion (Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation 2015). Given this scenario it will not be too far-fetched to consider India is now in the second level of hierarchy of needs pyramid. As shown in Maslow's (1943) need pyramid the main concerns at the second level are education, employment, health, security. Justino (2007) also shows that using redistributive transfers to pacify people can be an important tool available to the government. Since her measure of redistributive transfer in her analysis of few Indian states is an aggregate composite index, it is difficult to tease the effect of each sector on the level of violence. Cross-nationally it has been seen that investments made in social sector towards educational upliftment of the masses can help in reducing discontent amongst people (Thyne 2006). Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson (1999) note that the expenditure allocations within social sectors matter for education and health status.

Following the above-mentioned discussion, the main explanatory variables to measure grievances are the *percentage of enrollment in the age group of 18-23* and *infant mortality rate* for each state-year in India between 2001 and 2012. Data on these two variables has been taken from IndiaStat as collated from the Annual Reports of Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development for each states and Census of India (2001, 2011). It is assumed that youth group from 15-24 should mainly worry about educational opportunities. High enrolment would indicate that government policies are in line with offering educational facilities to its people.

Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching age one per thousand live births in the each of the 29 Indian states in each year between 2001-2012. Due to unavailability

³ Indiastat is owned by Datanet India and is one of the most authentic site for socio-economic data on Indian states. It runs under the aegis of Department of Statistics, Govt. of India.

of data, it was difficult to find health expenditure made by the government. However, there is an added advantage of using infant mortality rate instead of government expenditure in the health sector. Mortality rate amongst infants is also indicative of the standard of living of people of poorer sections of the society, infrastructure, public services, education of mothers, and income level among other factors (Goldstone 2002; Costello, Jenkins and Aly 2015).

Intuitively, one observes that conditions leading to low-intensity civil violence are distinct from that of civil wars. Since initial mobilization is relatively cheaper, grievances might be sufficient to motivate the disgruntled to participate in low-intensity civil violence (Regan and Norton 2005). Cross-national literature argues that poor countries are always more prone to civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Fearon & Laitin 2003). To see whether this national phenomenon also holds at the sub-national level, I control for the state level of wealth. I add *per capita measure of state's domestic product (log)*. It also indicates state level economic and social development (Justino 2007). The data for this variable is taken from State Ministry of Economic Development for each state-year reported on Indiastat.

I also add a control for structural characteristics like presence of uneven terrain, which is considered cross-nationally to have some effect on onset of civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Fearon 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Although riots are also a form of collective action like civil wars, these are slightly different with respect to its organization structure. Most importantly, it is spontaneous, so there is no such organized recruiting required for the rebel's group. For participating in riots, what matters more is willingness, rather than an opportunity in the form abundant natural resources or rough terrain. Further, presence of unfavorable terrain like mountains or forests does not help in rioting. Therefore, the structural characteristics emphasized in the cross-national literature have more significance for civil wars, which is more violent and lasts longer than riots. Nevertheless, I have controlled for percentage of forest area in my analysis. Large *populations* are always a source of chaos for all practical reasons (Fearon and Laitin 2003). It increases pressure on the government to keep tab on all rising resentments and raises difficulty in allocating resources. At the same time, large populations also mean bigger pool of recruits. Like civil wars, one can imagine that states with large population are more prone to all forms of civil unrest. I add a control for log of population for all states during the time-period under review. Data for this variable is taken from Census of India (2001, 2011).

Data Analysis

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. Wide range of variation in all variables is visible for 29 Indian states. While Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka and West Bengal are the most well off states drawing lot of foreign investments and high GDP

growth rate, Bihar, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh is considered BIMAR (sick) states of India. There have been approximately 10-11 thousand riots in Bihar and Rajasthan, in 2011-12, while Punjab and northeastern states like Manipur and Meghalaya appears to be a relatively peaceful. The table reports wide variation in the principal explanatory variables, as well. Infant mortality rate ranges from 10 in some states to, as high as, 91 in other states. Similarly, there exists great variation in the gross enrolment rates amongst the states. One observes least variation in state's population with regards to young adults. Approximately all 29 states have over 45% of their population in the age group of 15-29 years. Maximum variance is found in the 25-29 years' age group.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min.	Max.
Riots	348	2217.15	2713.01	0	11214
IMR	345	43.92	18.06	10	91
Enrolment	348	17.1	6.01	6.7	35.9
Youth (15-19)	348	10.62	1.26	7.82	14.2
Youth (20-24)	348	9.69	1.29	7.76	12.57
Youth (25-29)	348	8.67	1.87	0.88	11.95
Forest Cover	348	32.75	23.79	3.5	90.68
State GDPpc	348	10.21	0.56	8.69	11.79
Population	348	16.53	1.61	13.2	19.12
Lag Riots	347	2223.31	2714.49	0	11214

Table 2-4 reports the results from cross-sectional analyses. Although I used a cross-section time-series dataset, I limit my statistical analyses to cross-section only. Panel estimates would be unsuitable in this regard as the time-period under review is only one decade. There is expectantly not much variation in population data in a time span of ten years. Census of India is reported every 10 years like other countries. Since there is almost no variation in data annually, it becomes pointless to conduct panel analysis to see change over time.

Table 2 reports results from analyzing the role of different age groups of youth individually on internal unrest (incidence of riots). As is evident from all 4 columns, in all model specification, the age groups of 15-19 and 20-24 are significantly related to the dependent variable. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the effect of youth groups from age 15-24 is pacifying on internal order. The negative and significant co-efficient of these variables denote that if a state has higher percentage of young people in the age group of 15-24, it will be relatively peaceful. These results are indicative of the fact that youth bulge is not a threat as was seen earlier. They are not threats to the internal peace, rather the opposite. However, more in-

depth analysis required to see the causal mechanism – why this age-group has pacifying effect? One explanation that can be put forth is now there is more to lose. Enrollment has increased tremendously over the last two decades (Mitra and Verick 2013). Hence, the opportunity cost has increased for participating in any such collective actions. It is no longer easy for youth groups to resolve their non-participation problems, which in turn, has led to the negative and significant effect on internal order.

On the other hand, if there are lots of young people in the state who belong to the 25-29 age group, the threat factor increases significantly. One can say that the negative effect of youth bulge what researchers have found so far is due to this age group.

The most convincing explanation of the above-mentioned results could be inferred from the employment rates. As reported by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Government of India, youth unemployment is very high in the age group of 18-29 (Youth Employment-Unemployment Scenario, 2013-14). It is around 12.9 percent. The survey further states that most of the youth in this age group are either self-employed (41.9 percent) or casual workers (34.9 percent), while remaining 23.9 percent are wage/ salaried employee and contract category worker. It has also been found that with the increasing education level, unemployment rate has been also increased for this age group. The unemployment rate of a person in this age group with a bachelor's degree is 28 percent (Youth Employment-Unemployment Scenario, 2013-14). This data can be considered enough to explain why we found the age group 25-29 as most threatening. Even though young boys and girls are investing time and effort in their education, they are not getting expected returns from that investment due to lack of meaningful employment.

Without jobs, the opportunity cost of participating in a collective action decreases for the 25-29 yrs age-group. At the same time, they feel deprived. Post-reform India has seen annual growth rate around 6-8%, particularly during the period under review (Ministry of Statistics and Policy Implementation, 2015). When the government is performing well, expectation of the populace also increases (Davies 1965). Unmet expectations lead to grievance, which, in turn, vents out in collective action. This assumption is further corroborated by results of the interaction effect of opportunity and willingness.

All other variables, infant mortality rate, state GDP per capita, percentage of Muslim population and previous incidents of riots show expected results. States with high IMR, high percentage of Muslim population, past incidents of riots and low GDP per capita are significantly more prone to facing civil unrest compared to others.

To improve confidence and generalizability of these results, I further use bootstrap⁴ estimation techniques with 50 samples (Shrout and Bolger 2002). The results from bootstrapping are reported in Table 2, column (5). As discussed earlier, young people in the age group of 15-24 do not pose significant threat to internal order of the states. The main threat comes from the age group of 25-29, higher infant mortality rate (implying poor standard of living), poor income per capita, higher percentage of Muslim population and previous incidences of riots. Therefore, it is not fair to consider the entire population of young people as threatening and problem-makers. Hence, we reassert that there are certain conditions when these structural conditions become opportunity for collective action. There should be some long felt dissatisfaction to foment willingness to participate or not participate in collective action.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Youth (15-19)	-0.566*** (0.09)	-0.47*** (0.11)	-0.40*** (0.09)	-0.47*** (0.093)	-0.471*** (0.080)
Youth (20-24)	-0.88*** (0.12)	-0.95*** (0.12)	-0.55*** (0.12)	-0.53*** (0.11)	-0.538*** (0.087)
Youth (25-29)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.006 (0.05)	0.015 (0.05)	0.189** (0.06)	0.189*** (0.048)
Enrolment		0.025* (0.015)	0.042** (0.014)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.009)
State GDP <i>per capita</i>			-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Riots (<i>lagged</i>)			0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
IMR			0.016** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.025*** (0.006)
Percentage of Muslims				0.019*** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.004)
Constant	21.59*** (0.59)	20.72*** (0.77)	14.63*** (1.015)	12.89*** (1.069)	12.89*** (1.149)
No. of Obs.	348	348	344	344	344

⁴ Bootstrap is a widely applicable, nonparametric approach to statistical inference that substitutes intensive computation for more traditional distribution assumptions and asymptotic results. The bootstrap can be used to derive accurate standard errors, confidence intervals, and hypothesis tests for most statistics. Bootstrapping uses the sample data to estimate relevant characteristics of the population. The key bootstrap analogy is: The population is to the sample as the sample is to the bootstrap sample. (Bootstrapping Regression Models, Ch.21, retrieved from https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/21122_Chapter_21.pdf)

***p< 0.00; **p<0.05; *p<0.10

Educational Opportunities

Table 3 and 4 reports the results from the interaction effect of youth groups and factors of grievances. As discussed earlier, unemployment is a major source of grievance, which can make young people aggressive. Unemployment not only creates resentment, it also opens up a section of population as potential recruit for the rebel groups. However, due to unavailability of employment data for the entire time-period under review, I operationalize grievance by presence/absence of educational opportunities and overall standard of living.

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Youth (15-19)	-0.499** (0.148)			-0.129 (0.245)
Youth (20-24)		0.017 (0.151)		-1.744** (0.630)
Youth (25-29)			-0.067 (0.135)	2.005*** (0.530)
Enrolment	-0.105 (0.088)	0.325** (0.105)	0.070 (0.071)	0.384*** (0.109)
<i>Interaction 1</i> (Enrol*Y15-19)	0.013*** (0.008)			-0.008 (0.014)
<i>Interaction 2</i> (Enrol*Y20-24)		-0.030** (0.011)		0.076** (0.036)
<i>Interaction 3</i> (Enrol*Y25-29)			-0.005 (0.008)	-0.113*** (0.029)
State GDP per capita (log)	-0.046** (0.146)	0.498*** (0.140)	-0.372** (0.147)	-0.619*** (0.145)
Riots (lagged)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
IMR	0.003 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.010** (0.004)
Population (log)	0.771*** (0.069)	0.787*** (0.066)	0.911*** (0.065)	0.718*** (0.073)
Forest Cover				-0.006** (0.003)
Constant	2.707	-1.99	-4.64*	1.31

	(2.257)	(2.29)	(2.22)	(2.55)
No. of Obs.	344	344	344	344

***p< 0.00; **p<0.05; *p<0.10

Table 3 column (1-3) show results for interaction effects between each age group and gross enrolment rates individually. The first interaction term (enrolment x group 15-19) is significant and positive implying a state with high proportion of educated young people in the age group of 15-19 is more likely to face collective violence (also see Figure 1). It has been proved in many instances that it is the learned and not the ignorant who revolt (Goldstone 1993; Ginges 2005; Alfy 2016). One observes that nowadays education has lost its pacifying effect on civil violence (Thyne 2005). Rather, knowledge can become an effective tool for networking and mobilizing.

On the other hand, the significant and negative coefficient of the second interaction term (enrolment x group 20-24) in column (2) indicates that educated young people in the age group of 20-24 are not threatening to internal order of a state. It is an important research area for future to see the true effect of education on political stability. However, second interaction term becomes positive and significant when controlled for other variables (column 4). Undoubtedly, enrolment opportunities are uppermost priority for the young people in the 15-24 years age group.




Figure 1: Effect of Youth Bulge and Enrolment

The third interaction term (enrolment x group 25-29) fails to reach significance and changes direction from previous analyses. However, in column (4) we find that the third interaction term is negative and highly significant. This implies that if a state has low percentage of youth in the age group of 25-29 and a low enrolment rate, it can be relatively peaceful. One explanation for this outcome can be that enrolment is not a priority for this particular age group. It is expected

that by 25 years of age, a person has already completed his education and looking for employment (since we know that the enrolment variable measures gross enrolment ratio for age group of 18-23). Therefore, a measure of available jobs or enrolment in higher/ technical education would have been an appropriate measure to test the interaction effect of this youth group.

One last quick observation here is that percentage of forest cover, included here as control variable, is negative and significant. First, it contradicts our long held belief about the causal relation between rough terrain and civil violence. As we find in the analyses here, that rough terrain is apparently not conducive to civil unrest. However, it can be argued that increasing urbanization in today's world has necessitated deforestation in many places. Hence, it may not be rough terrain like mountains or forests that help in organizing collective action any more. Rather, increasing urbanization with the rapid growth of social media has fueled unrest already in some places. For example, many scholars term the Arab Spring as Twitter Revolution (Alfy 2016). The increasing pressure that urbanization puts on limited resources is bound to foment grievances, polarization and deprivation, which ultimately funnels out with the help of social media. This would warrant more research and analysis in this area, which transcends the scope of this paper. I would reserve it for future.

Standard of Living

The second factor from which grievances may emanate is the overall standard of living, operationalized here as infant mortality rate. Table 4 reports results from the effect of overall standard of living on youth groups. None of the youth age groups are a threat to internal order in itself as is evident in Column (1-3). All the co-efficient negative and significant. This supports my argument that nothing is an opportunity unless there is motivation to use it. This is further corroborated when we look at the interaction effect between IMR (measure of standard of living) and youth group of 20-24 (column 2-4). The coefficient for this interaction term is positive and significant implying that in states with high proportion of young people in the age group of 20-24, poor standard of living significantly increases the risk of collective action. Here we see the presence of both opportunity (large group of disgruntled youth) and willingness created by low living standards. It is not difficult to explain this causality. Young people in the age group of 20-24 are almost in their working age, where they expect to earn enough to provide good living standards for themselves and their families. In states with lack of employment opportunities frustrates young people, as they perceive themselves as unemployed in future. These insecurities predispose these youth as recruits for rebel leaders who promise positive changes. Since enrolment rate is on an increase in India, these dissatisfied, educated young people significantly

become a threat to political stability. A failed dream is more dangerous than a dream not sought after (Davie 1965).




Figure 2: Effect of Std. of Living and Youth Bulge

New Role of Education

Interestingly, we find that increasing enrolment significantly increases chance of internal unrest (Table 3 and 4). To be borne in mind, that more people acquire knowledge, they become more and more aware of their situation. Goldstone observes that potential for violence and political change is higher in societies in the second stage of transition, which is characterized by a high proportion of youth, aged 15-24 and a large section of educated middle class that the labor market is unable to absorb (Alfy 2016). Educated young people with constant exposure to social media are a combustible combination (Ginges 2005; Alfy 2016). Scholars have identified rising literacy and falling birth rates as an important indicator that led to the Arab Awakening (Byun and Hollander 2015; Mark Lynch 2011). According to Ginges (2005) it is not the ignorant, but the most knowledgeable youth who rebel. In this present world, where everyone has access to all information around the world, it becomes even more important for government to perform better. Education will have pacifying effect if it is properly channelized, if young people get right opportunities/jobs to use what they have learnt. Absence of such right opportunities can flip the coin.

In India, one observes in the recent decade, unemployment has increased along with educational levels (Mitra and Verick 2013). They further contend that high unemployment amongst educated youth can lead to insurgencies. The unemployment rate in India for a person with a Diploma above graduate degree is 22.4 percent (Mitra and Verick 2013). Most of the youth employed are found in unorganized sector or belonging to low-income families or from the scheduled castes/tribes and other backward classes. This is not a healthy scenario as far as long term political stability is concerned.

Table 4: Youth Bulge and Standard of Living

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Youth (15-19)	-0.370** (0.131)			0.339* (0.220)
Youth (20-24)		-0.513*** (0.140)		-1.468** (0.501)
Youth (25-29)			-0.404*** (0.118)	0.606** (0.356)
IMR	-0.023 (0.037)	-0.044 (0.033)	-0.046** (0.018)	-0.021 (0.036)
<i>Interaction 4</i> (IMR*Y15-19)	0.002 (0.003)			-0.012** (0.005)
<i>Interaction 5</i> (IMR*Y20-24)		0.004 (0.003)		0.024** (0.008)
<i>Interaction 6</i> (IMR*Y25-29)			0.004** (0.001)	-0.010** (0.005)
Enrolment	0.033** (0.011)	0.034** (0.011)	0.033** (0.11)	0.029** (0.011)
State GDP <i>per capita</i>	-0.537*** (0.150)	-0.512** (0.155)	-0.461** (0.150)	-0.514** (0.157)
Riots (<i>lagged</i>)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Population (<i>log</i>)	0.815*** (0.068)	0.763*** (0.066)	0.844*** (0.062)	0.724*** (0.071)
Constant	1.408 (2.58)	3.42 (2.79)	0.313 (2.56)	4.401 (2.86)
No. of Obs.	344	344	344	344

***p< 0.00; **p<0.05; *p<0.10

CONCLUSION

According to Bouthol (1968) youth bulge becomes a security threat due to the breakdown of natural demographic-economic equilibrium. Scarcity of youth-specific resources like jobs, educational opportunities, are potent causes of grievances (Roche 2010; Mitra and Verick 2013). In absence of such opportunities, it becomes easier for vanguard groups to mobilize youth promising them reform of society (Roche 2010). Presence of all these conditions in India makes it a fertile ground for testing the long-held beliefs about role of youth bulge on collective dissent.

As is evident from the analyses of 28 Indian states and Delhi NCR presented in this paper, youth groups are not an opportunity in itself. There are particular socio-economic conditions that create grievances, which in turn leads to motivation for collective action. As identified, education, employment, health and an overall standard of living are important priorities for young people in all countries (Mitra and Verick 2013). However, priorities are different for different age groups. For example, educational opportunities are top-most priority for youth groups 15-24 years of age. On the other hand, employment, health and general living standards are what young people in the age group of 20-29 years look for. Given the budget constraint under which most government operates, it is better to have more targeted policy responses to the problems faced by the youth.

Another interesting result reported here is regarding the enrolment. As per the results, increasing enrolment also significantly increases chances of internal disorder. In all model specification, the gross enrolment rate remains positively and significantly related to incidence of riots. Education positively creates individual and collective political efficacy that is essential to political engagement (Cohen and Dawson 1993). High civic knowledge can also lead to low trust in government (Paige 1971). These finding also supports the argument presented in this paper as we find that educated youth group of 20-24 years are most susceptible to collective action. As and when people know and learn, they also learn to demand for more (Huntington 1968). This is also the reason why social media has become an important tool in many revolutions today, since educated young people can effectively use social media to connect and mobilize, which helps in resolving many problems of non-participation through market and contract based solutions.

Since approximately fifty percent of the population is in the youth groups 15-29 years of age, India has less than fifty percent chance of experiencing stable democracy. All these facts direct government to focus its policies more cautiously. Government should monitor the proper use of its funds. More schools should be built with modern state of art facilities. So, students coming out of those schools are equipped in all walks of life. The focus should be towards more and more skill-based training, technical/vocational education and similar other opportunities which

would improve the employability of the youth population. The skill-based job opportunities initiated by the present government can go a long way. Present Indian P.M. Narendra Modi gave a clarion call to turn India into a “Skill Capital of the World” (Ministry of Skill Development, Government of India). If this program is successfully implemented, it can help reduce lot of unemployment and underemployment problems. In a nutshell, focused government policies can only help in realizing the true potentials of youth bulge, particularly in developing countries like India.

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