ROUTINIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION OF INTERACTION IN GIDDENS’S STRUCTURATION THEORY

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ABSTRACT

In his theory of structuration, Anthony Giddens emphasized on routinization and regionalization of interaction. Giddens suggested that both the ontological security of agents and the institutionalization of structures in time and space depend on routinized and regionalized interaction among actors. Routinization of interaction patterns reproduces structure that is rules and resources and institutions. At the same time, routinization gives predictability to actions and, in so doing provides a sense of ontological security. Thus, routines become critical for the most basic aspects of structure and human agency. Similarly, regionalization orders action in space by positioning actors in places relative to one another and by circumscribing how they are to present themselves and act. As with routines, the regionalization of interaction is essential to the sustenance of broader structural patterns and ontological security of actors because it orders people’s interactions in space and time, which in turn reproduces structures and meets an agent’s needs for ontological security. The present paper gives a deeper insight on this routinization and regionalization of interaction that forms a significant part of the structuration theory formulated by Anthony Giddens.

Keywords: structuration, structure, routinization, regionalization, interaction

INFLUENCES LEADING ANTHONY GIDDENS TOWARDS FRAMING STRUCTURATION THEORY

The theory of structuration is a general theory aiming to explore the interaction between social structure and human agency. It emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a theoretical alternative to both structural-functionalist and interactionist perspectives. Although it is only associated with the work of Anthony Giddens, it would be mistaken to conceive of the theory as an isolated intellectual product. Indeed, some of the central notions of structuration theory were simultaneously developed by other authors. Giddens’s project is
ambiguous. He attempts to overcome a number of dualisms in social theory, for instance, the
dualism between actor-oriented approaches and structure-oriented approaches, or between
subjective and objective orientations. He integrates a wide diversity of very different
disciplines consisting of Martin Heidegger’s existentialism, H.G.Gadamer’s hermeneutics,
Alfred Schutz’s phenomenology, Harold Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology and Michel
Foucault’s and Jacques Derrida’s post-structuralism, to name only a few. Furthermore, his
approach is aimed at replacing what he calls the ‘orthodox consensus’ which dominated
sociology in the post-war period and which is characterized by its adherence to functionalist
theory and positivist epistemology. But however wide-ranging Giddens’s proposals are, it is
important to remember that they did not arise out of an intellectual vacuum. Giddens’s overall
project was closely related to a number of other intellectual developments and a general
dissatisfaction with some of the dominant views at the time. Giddens’s project follows a
general trend away from positivist epistemology in the social sciences, and it is thus no
surprise that positivism is often targeted in his work. His concerns in this respect are not so
much with general issues in philosophy of science, although he is aware, for instance, of
Quine’s critique of the alleged distinction between theoretical and observation statements, the
problems with the verification theory of meaning, and so on. His interest is more with the
distorted view of human conduct of what he calls the ‘orthodox consensus’ in the social
sciences which is a particular research programme, not necessarily explicitly articulated and
which became dominant in the course of the twentieth century. Apart from the functionalist
dimension, of which more in due course, the orthodox consensus courts the doctrine of
naturalism which postulates a methodological unity between natural and the social sciences.
However unobtainable or unsatisfactory in practice, the way in which natural scientists
operate remains the norm to be emulated by social scientists. Giddens believes a number of
phenomenological insights have to be taken seriously, and that doing this jeopardizes the
ambitions of the positivist tradition. People’s conduct is simply not to be explained by
referring to external societal factors acting upon them, as if these factors were not dissimilar
from causes in the natural sciences. Giddens agrees with Harre and others who believe that
lessons from the linguistic turn in philosophy led to a Copernican revolution in the social
sciences which states that human conduct is no longer to be seen as pushed by external forces,
but instead can only be understood in terms of reflective self-monitoring and tacit knowledge.
Structures do not act upon people. Instead, people draw upon structures for the initiation of
their actions. Giddens rejects functionalism as vigorously as positivism. Basically, he cites
five arguments against functionalist explanations. First, functionalism somehow fails to
conceive of social life as actively constituted through people’s actions, erroneously portraying
individuals as ‘cultural dopes’. Human agency is mistakenly subordinated to the process by
which values are internalized in the personality structure of the individuals. Second,
functionalism mistakenly attributes needs or ‘functional exigencies’ to social systems. Counterfactual arguments are the only ones in which it is defensible to talk about ‘system needs’, but close scrutiny shows that, in spite of ‘prima facie’ similarities, their logical format differs from a functionalist type of argument. Third, whether in Parsons’s work or in Merton’s, the concept of power is secondary compared to the overriding role of norms and values. This lacuna is incompatible with Giddens’s view; power plays a central role in his structuration theory. Fourth, functionalism fails to take into account the ‘negotiated’ character of norms and values. That is, value patterns and normative regulations can be interpreted differently by various groups. Opposing interpretations are often due to conflicting interests in society. Finally, Giddens and functionalists differ particularly in the way in which they conceive of the relationship between time and social order. At least in its archetypal form, functionalist frames of reference tend to, implicitly or explicitly, conceive of social order by taking a snapshot of society. It is held that social order is revealed by analyzing how different parts of a social system are functionally interrelated or related to a larger whole, and such an analysis does not involve the lapse of time. For understanding social change, a diachronic analysis ought to be adopted, but for understanding social order a snapshot will do. For Giddens, this view of the interrelationship between order and synchronic analysis is untenable. Functionalism disregards the insight that social order is produced and reproduced through time by knowledgeable agents. It erroneously equates time with social change, whereas time also implies the skilful production of order, and this production is due to tacit knowledgeable practical consciousness on the part of the individuals involved (Baert, 1998).

Baert (1998) mentions that evolutionary theory in the social sciences is another of Giddens ‘bêtes noires’. In Giddens’s view, evolution, in order to be a distinctive explanatory frame of reference, should refer to a number of features. The first is the notion that there is an analogy or ‘conceptual continuity’ between social and biological evolution, and that there is a sequence of stages throughout history applicable to all societies. The second is the notion that there is a mechanism which explains the transition from one stage of society to another, often utilizing the concept of ‘adaptation’. Giddens’s main target for critique is this concept of adaptation, which he argues, is either diffuse or vague. Giddens’s criticisms of evolutionism go, however, further than that. He asserts that any evolutionist perspective is in danger of drawing upon one of the following mistaken conceptions: ‘unilinear compression’, ‘homological compression’, ‘normative illusion’ or ‘temporal distortion’. Unilinear compression is the erroneous belief that a statement about development in all societies can be inferred from the observation of sequences of stages in a particular society. Giddens’s objection is the standard argument against any inductivist reasoning, it is impossible to infer general laws from a finite number of observations. Homologica
search for homology or structural identity between individual and societal development. Homological compression implies, amongst other things that the earlier stages of societal development mirror the lack of complexity in early psychological development. Giddens sees Freud, Marcuse and Elias as components of this view, and he argues against them on empirical grounds. For instance, he thinks that there is not enough evidence to support their argument that the ‘psychic’ organization between oral cultures and ‘civilizations’ differs significantly. Normative illusion is the erroneous tendency to understand economic or ‘adaptive’ power in terms of moral superiority. Many evolutionist theories implicitly or explicitly presume that more control and more employment of one’s environment is a worthwhile aim. It might be true that contemporary societies have greater capacity to adjust to, or make use of, their environment, but this should not be seen as an unequivocally positive feature. Finally, temporal distortion refers to the inability to distinguish between ‘history’ and ‘historicity’, and therefore the mistaken tendency to reduce the lapse of time to change. One of the recurring ideas in structuration theory is that time also implies the production of order. Amongst the positive influences on Giddens’s structuration theory are interpretative approaches to the social realm, in particular Schutz’s phenomenology, Peter Wittgensteinian-inspired philosophy of the social sciences and Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology. Giddens argues that, because of its Durkheimian heritage and its naturalistic inclinations, the orthodox consensus disregarded the interpretative approaches as being outside the realm of a scientifically adequate explanation of the social. From a critical reading of these interpretative schools, a number of ideas and concepts are taken up by Giddens, and further incorporated within his broader framework. First, for him, sociology differs from the natural sciences in that it does not deal with a ‘pre-given’ universe of objects. People attribute meaning to their surrounding social world and act accordingly. It follows that sociology is characterized by a double hermeneutic’: that is, sociology interprets its subject matter, which is itself pregnant with meaning. Second, Giddens employs the notion of reflexivity. That is, he sees individuals as constantly attending to their actions, and regularly reflecting upon the conditions of these actions. He insists that people often incorporate this knowledge as they go along. Third, Giddens takes up the notion of tacit, mutual knowledge, and he links this with the concept of reflexivity. Individuals of the same culture share knowledge of their local social rules. This knowledge is not necessarily discursive or theoretical. It refers instead to skilled performances that is to procedures of ‘how to go on’ in social life. Fourth, Giddens learns from these interpretative schools that structures should not be seen as merely constraining, but also enabling. Rather than conceiving them as an impediment to action, structures ought to be seen as a ‘sine qua non’ for the emergency of agency. A second important influence is Goffman. Giddens’s argument is that Goffman’s work has been misunderstood in a number of ways. First, Goffman has been erroneously portrayed simply as a brilliant narrator, highly observant
about the minutiae of social life, but whose work lacks intellectual unity. Against this view, Giddens argues that recurrent theoretical themes and preoccupations can be detected throughout Goffman’s work. Second, Giddens opposes the view that Goffman’s work is limited in scope, reflecting merely white American middle-class lifestyles. Giddens thinks that a number of Goffman’s theoretical insights have more universal value than is often recognized. Third, it has sometimes been argued that Goffman portrays people as mere ‘performers’, cynically manipulating their social environment which is a reflection, some would say of the very amoral American middle class to which Goffman’s analysis is restricted. Giddens argues that, rather than portraying social life as amoral, Goffman’s analysis suggests the importance of trust and tact as crucial features of social interaction. In Goffman’s work, Giddens finds a consistent attempt to draw our attention to the way in which people routinely ‘repair’ the moral basis of their interactions, through the use of tact, through ‘remedial practices’, through helping others to save face, and so on. It is this theme, in particular, that Giddens borrows for his structuration theory. A third source of influence is psychoanalysis and, in particular, Erikson’s ego-psychology. Giddens is particularly interested in the early phases of Erikson’s stage theory of psychological development, seeing the first phase as one in which feelings of ‘ontological security’ are gradually instilled through warmth and affection. The unconscious is linked to people’s avoidance of anxiety and their preservation of self-esteem. From an early stage onwards, trust is instilled within the personality structure of the child. By trust, Giddens understands here the psychological ‘binding’ of time and space in that the child learns that absence of the mother does not imply desertion. Later defences are constructed against other anxiety-provoking mechanisms such as shame, doubt and guilt. This form of generalized trust is the foundation for a stable personality and, Giddens continues, it explains the close relationship between routines, rule-following and ontological security. This can also be used to explain the extent to which Garfinkel’s experiments with trust upset the people who were subject to them.

The sociological relevance of existentialism is relatively unexplored, and Giddens is a notable exception in this regard. For instance, his concept of agency as transformative capacity shows striking affinities with existentialist accounts of freedom, but it is especially with regard to the problem of time that he inherits existentialist notions. The German philosopher Heidegger has been a specific influence on Giddens in this respect. Giddens borrows Heidegger’s distinction between ontology and epistemology, and, relatedly, between ‘ontic’ time and time at an existential level. Rather than conceiving of time as a measurable unit or ‘framework’ of objects or activities, time is constitutive of being. Rather than a ‘contentless form’ in which objects exist, time and space have to be defined in terms of ‘presencing’. That is, time-space intervals are not instants, but ‘structured differences which give form to content, whether this be hours on a clock, notes in a musical rhythm, or centimeters on a ruler’. From Heidegger,
Giddens also recalls that, as contrasted with animals, human beings are aware of the finitude of their existence. Furthermore, compared with animals, human beings, through language, are able to transcend presence to go beyond the immediacy of sensory experience. The interpenetration of presence and absence is indeed a central feature of the time-related components of Giddens’s theory of structuration and it also appears in his use of time-geography. Giddens’s interest in time-related topics is reflected in his discussions of time-geography, especially Torsten Hagerstrand’s, Allan Pred’s and Tommy Carlstein’s. Whereas time and space have been traditionally conceived of as mere environments of action, time-geography demonstrates how social systems are constituted across time and space. Time-geography pays attention to the constraints of people’s routine movements, in circumstances of co-presence, through time and space. Amongst these constraints are ‘corporeality’, the finitude of the life span, people’s limited ability to do many things at once, the fact that movement in space implies movement in time and the limited ‘packing capacity’ of time and space. Hagerstrand’s time-space maps draw patterns of movement of individuals within the above constraints. However, Giddens deplores the fact that whilst time-geography tends to conceive of individuals as purposive beings, little attention is actually given to the nature and origins of these intentions or goals. Furthermore, time-geographers tend to take ‘stations’ or ‘domains’ as given. They overemphasize the constraining features of social structure, and neglect its enabling characteristics. Also time-geography has an underdeveloped conception of power. Structuralism and post-structuralism had an important effect on Giddens’s intellectual development, although he was not uncritical of these ideas. Saussure’s distinction between speech and language is central to Giddens’s own distinction between system and structure, and he also draws upon the distinction between the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. Although he does not accept the structuralist tendency to ignore the relation between meaning and practice, overall he is sympathetic to its holistic theory of meaning. Related to Giddens’s rejection of the phenomenalist features of positivist epistemology, is an apparent acceptance of the structuralist commitment to realism. Structuralism, as a social theory, teaches Giddens the importance of unacknowledged conditions of purposive conduct. What structuralist and post-structuralist authors lack, for Giddens, is a theoretical account of agency and praxis, and their relationship to social reproduction. On the same point, whilst fully exploiting the Durkheimian notion of structural constraint, ‘structural sociology’ tends to ignore the fact that social structure also empowers the individual. Again and again Giddens insists that far from structure precluding agency, it is the precondition for its emergence. Furthermore, some structuralists, such as Levi-Strauss, tend to confuse discursive and practical consciousness, mistakenly assuming that if something is not discursively available then it must be unconscious. In contrast, Giddens’s structuration theory acknowledges the central role of practical consciousness in everyday interaction (Baert, 1998).
GIDDEN’S STRUCTURATION THEORY

Structuration theory is set out by Anthony Giddens in three main works, ‘New Rules of Sociological Method’, ‘Central Problems in Social Theory’ and ‘The Constitution of Society’ and is also discussed in ‘A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism’. It may be seen as an attempt to resolve a fundamental division within the social sciences between those who consider social phenomena as products of the action of human ‘agents’ in the light of their subjective interpretation of the world, and others who see them as caused by the influence of objective, exogenous social structures. Giddens attempts to ‘square this circle’ by proposing that structure and agency be viewed, not as independent and conflicting elements, but as a mutually interacting duality. Thus social structure is seen as being drawn on by human agents in their actions, while the actions of humans in social contexts serve to produce, and reproduce, the social structure. Structure is thus not simply a straitjacket, but is also a resource to be deployed by humans in their actions: it is enabling as well as disabling. More specifically, Giddens identifies three dimensions of structure, drawing from earlier work of Durkheim, Marx and Weber, which he describes as signification, domination and legitimation. These are seen as interacting through modalities of, respectively, interpretative schemes, resources and norms, with human action of communication, power and sanctions. The separation of these dimensions is simply for analytical convenience, since they are in practice intimately interlinked. For example the operation of norms depends upon power relationships for its effectiveness and is deployed through symbolic and linguistic devices. An everyday example may help to illustrate these concepts, albeit at the cost of presenting structuration in a rather more mechanistic way than might be desirable. Thus, when buying an item at a shop drawings on structures of signification tell us that items have prices and that it may be expected that these are to be displayed on or near them and that the pieces of paper or metal (money) in our pockets are valid forms of exchange for these items. Our interpretative schemes allow us to translate the symbols on the price tag into an idea of how much money we will need to buy them. Similarly drawings on structures of domination indicate that money gives others the right to acquire the item and expect the shopkeeper to hand over the item in exchange for the money. There are also structures of legitimation which define the appropriate norms of exchange in the particular cultural context—in Britain there is usually no haggle over the price and would expect to receive sanctions if it is tried to take the item without paying. In acting in the established way these existing structures are reinforced. For example, in proffering the appropriate amount of money for the items the structure of signification are reproduced, in receiving the item in exchange for the money the structure of domination is reproduced, in paying the ticket price for the goods the structure of legitimation is reinforced. In each instance, however, there is the possibility of failure to reproduce the structure. There could be an argument with the shopkeeper over the meaning of the symbols
on the price tag, arm-wrestle with him or her to decide the right to acquire the item, or take the item without paying. If enough people behaved in that way then one might expect the existing structures to change. Giddens emphasizes that social structures do not exist independent of human action, nor are they material entities. He describes them as ‘traces in the mind’ and argues that they exist only through the action of humans. This leads to a view of human beings as being in a constant state of reflexive monitoring of their situation and to the omnipresent potential for change. That there may be unawareness of this monitoring or of the continuous opportunities for change is ascribed by Giddens to the existence of two types of consciousness which are practical and discursive. The former relates to our ability to act in a knowledgeable way and the latter to our incomplete explanations for those actions. Therefore, Giddens argues that people know more than what they say. In addition, humans cannot determine exactly the way in which structure is produced and reproduced. Giddens therefore draws attention to the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of intentional action. For example, the reproduction of the legitimation of certain forms of metal and paper as valid currency in our shop example may promote the production of counterfeit money to ‘cash in’ on this acceptance. The reproduction of lawful behaviour therefore helps to promote illegal behaviour as an unintended consequence (Jones, 1999).

According to Jones (1999), in Giddens’s own view, the origins of structuration theory represented a reaction to the perceived deficiencies of the two major prevailing schools of sociological thought. On the one hand there was ‘naturalistic’ sociology, a term Giddens prefers to the ‘more diffuse and ambiguous label positivism’, in particular functionalism especially as developed by Parsons but also structuralism and post-structuralism. These approaches, particularly functionalism, he argues, are ‘strong on structure, but weak on action’, underplaying the importance of human agency, and imputing purposes, reasons, and needs to society rather than to individuals. On the other hand, Giddens is also critical of interpretative sociology which, he argues, are ‘strong on action, but weak on structure’, having little to say on issues of ‘constraint, power and large-scale social organisation’. Structuration is thus seen as a means of breaking out of this unsatisfactory dualism of action and structure and also that between individual and society. Not surprisingly Giddens rejection of both naturalistic and interpretative sociology and his claim to provide a means of transcending their differences has provoked considerable criticism from adherents of both schools and accusations of syncretism and wilful eclecticism. Certainly the wide range of sources on which he has drawn in developing the theory, his multiple elaborations of the central concepts, and the idiosyncratic terminology already alluded to, mean that it is often difficult to pin down the character of structuration theory. This has led, for e.g, to it being identified both as post-modern and as insufficiently pluralistic and irredeemably modernist. This issue cannot be resolved but the more general point that structuration was set up in
opposition to both functionalist or determinist and interpretative or voluntarist models of social action is an important one that should not be lost in efforts to slot it into a particular theoretical pigeonhole. The other significant feature of structuration concerns methodology where, as Bryant and Jary note, Giddens adopts a post-empiricist and anti-positivist stance. This denies the existence of universal laws of human activity and emphasizes the centrality of the interpretative endeavour, describing social science as ‘irretrievably hermeneutic’. Giddens, however does not reject the potential contribution of ‘technically-sophisticated, hard-edged’ research. Indeed in he specifically states that ‘I do not try to wield a methodological scalpel … there is [nothing] in the logic or the substance of structuration theory which would somehow prohibit the use of some specific research technique, such as survey methods, questionnaires or whatever’. Rather, he argues that ‘the intellectual claims of sociology do not rest distinctively upon [hard-edged research]. All social research in my view, no matter how mathematical or quantitative, presumes ethnography’.

REFLECTION ON GIDDENS’S ROUTINIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION OF INTERACTION

The ontological security of agents and the institutionalization of structures in time and space both depend on routinized and regionalized interaction among actors. Routinization of interaction patterns reproduces structure that is rules and resources and institutions. At the same time, routinization gives predictability to actions and, in so doing provides a sense of ontological security. Thus, routines become critical for the most basic aspects of structure and human agency. Similarly, regionalization orders action in space by positioning actors in places relative to one another and by circumscribing how they are to present themselves and act. As with routines, the regionalization of interaction is essential to the sustenance of broader structural patterns and ontological security of actors because it orders people’s interactions in space and time, which in turn reproduces structures and meets an agent’s needs for ontological security. Giddens sees routines as the key link between the episodic character of interactions which means they start, proceed, and end, on the one hand, and basic trust and security, on the other hand. Moreover, “the routinization of encounters is of major significance in binding the fleeting encounter to social reproduction and thus to the seeming ‘fixity’ of institutions”. In a very interesting discussion in which he borrows heavily from Erving Goffman but with a phenomenological twist, Giddens proposed several procedures, or mechanisms, that humans use to sustain routines which are opening and closing rituals, turn taking, tact, repositioning and framing. Firstly, because interaction is serial, that is it occurs sequentially, there must be symbolic markers of opening and closing. Such markers are essential to the maintenance of routines because they indicate when in the flow of time the elements of routine interaction are to begin and end. There are many such interpersonal
markers like words, facial gestures, positions of bodies and there are physical markers such as rooms, buildings, roads and equipment that also signal when certain routinized interactions are to begin and end. Secondly, turn taking in a conversation is another process that sustains a routine. All competent actors contain in their practical consciousness, or implicit stock of knowledge, a sense of how conversations are to proceed sequentially. People rely on “folk methods” to construct sequences of talk; in so doing, they sustain a routine and, hence, their psychological sense of security and the larger institutional context. Thirdly, tact is, in Giddens’s view, the main mechanism that sustains ‘trust’ or ‘ontological security’ over long time-space spans.” By tact, Giddens means a latent conceptual agreement among participants in interaction” about just how each party is to gesture and respond and about what is appropriate and inappropriate. People carry with them implicit stocks of knowledge that signal to them what would be “tactful” and what would be “rude” and “intrusive” and they use this sense of tact to regulate their emission of gestures, their talking, and their relative positioning in situations “to remain tactful”, thereby sustaining their sense of trust and the larger social order. Fourthly, Giddens rejects the idea of “role” as very useful and substitutes the notion of “position”. People bring to situations a position or “social identity that carries with it a certain range of prerogatives and obligations”, and they emit gestures in a process of mutual positioning, such as locating their bodies in certain points, asserting their prerogatives, and signaling their obligations. In this way, interactions can be routinized, and people can sustain their sense of mutual trust as well as the larger social structures in which their interaction occurs. Fifthly, much of the coherence of positioning activities is made possible by “frames”, which provide formulas for interpreting a context. Interactions tend to be framed in the sense that there are rules that apply to them, but these are not purely normative in the sense of precise instructions for participants. Equally important, frames are more implicitly held, and they operate as markers that assert when certain behaviours and demeanors should be activated. In sum, social structure is extended across time by these techniques that produce and reproduce routines. In so stretching interaction across time in an orderly and predictable manner, people realize their need for a sense of trust in others. In this way, then, Giddens connects the most basic properties of structure that is rules and resources to the most fundamental features of human agents (Turner, 2003).

Turner (2003) also states that structuration theory is concerned with the reproduction of relations not only across time but also in space. With the concept of regionalization of interaction, Giddens addresses the intersection of space and time. For interaction is not just serial, moving in time; it is also located in space. Again borrowing from Goffman and also from time and space geography, Giddens introduces the concept of “locale” to account for the physical space in which interaction occurs as well as the contextual knowledge about what is to occur in this space. In a locale, actors are not only establishing their presence in relation to
one another but they are also using their stocks of practical knowledge to interpret the context of the locale. Such interpretations provide them with the relevant frames, the appropriate procedures for tact, and the salient forms for sequencing gestures and talk. Giddens classifies locales by their “modes”. Locales vary in their physical and symbolic boundaries, their duration across time, their span or extension in physical space and their character, or the ways they connect to other locales and to broader institutional patterns. Locales also vary in the degree to which they force people to sustain high public presence which Goffman termed frontstage or allow retreats to back regions where public presence is reduced which are Goffman’s backstage. They also vary in how much disclosure of self that is feelings, attitudes and emotions they require, some allowing “enclosure” or the withholding of self and other locales requiring “disclosure” of at least some aspects of self. Regionalization of interaction through the creation of locales facilitates the maintenance of routines. In turn, the maintenance of routines across time and space sustains institutional structures. Thus, the reflexive capacities of agents reproduce institutional patterns through routinized and regionalized systems of interaction.

CONCLUSION

In his structuration theory, Anthony Giddens emphasized on routinization and regionalization of interaction. Giddens sees routines as the key link between the episodic character of interactions which means they start, proceed, and end, on the one hand, and basic trust and security, on the other hand. Moreover, “the routinization of encounters is of major significance in binding the fleeting encounter to social reproduction and thus to the seeming ‘fixity’ of institutions”. He proposed several procedures or mechanisms that humans use to sustain routines which are opening and closing rituals, turn taking, tact, repositioning and framing. With the concept of regionalization of interaction, Giddens addresses the intersection of space and time. While dealing with regionalization, Giddens introduces the concept of “locale” to account for the physical space in which interaction occurs as well as the contextual knowledge about what is to occur in this space. Thus, regionalization of interaction through the creation of locales facilitates the maintenance of routines.
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