Title: The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in the Aftermath of
Verification
Authors:
Sushobhona Pal
Journal:
International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research (IJSSER)
ISSN: 2455-8834
Volume:
3
Issue:
12
Publication Date:
December 2018
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Sushobhona Pal
Assistant Professor, Shri Shikshayatan College, Kolkata
MLA 8 Pal, Sushobhona. "The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in the Aftermath of Verification." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 3, no. 12, Dec. 2018, pp. 7776-7786, ijsser.org/more2018.php?id=575. Accessed Dec. 2018.
APA 6 Pal, S. (2018, December). The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in the Aftermath of Verification. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 3(12), 7776-7786. Retrieved from ijsser.org/more2018.php?id=575
Chicago Pal, Sushobhona. "The Thinking Self in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy in the Aftermath of Verification." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 3, no. 12 (December 2018), 7776-7786. Accessed December, 2018. ijsser.org/more2018.php?id=575.
References
[1] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp. 17-18.
[2] . Ibid. p.18.
[3] . Ibid. p.21.
[4] . Ibid
[5] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33 in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p. 307.
[6] . Ibid. p.308. (Moore points out that later Wittgenstein seemed to suggest that “He has toothache” does not necessarily refer to a body but could be referring only to a voice, without reference to a body, identified as ‘his’).
[7] . In a language game where I paint for myself what I see, the picture does not contain me. [Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1968. Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”. Ed. R. Rhees. Philosophical Review 77. p.282].
[8] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.23.
[9] . Ibid. p.22.
[10] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33 in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.311.
[11] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. p.23.
[12] . Ibid. p.24.
[13] . Ibid. p.62.
[14] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1968. Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience” and “Sense Data”. Ed. R. Rhees. Philosophical Review 77. p.319.
[15] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp.62-63.
[16] . Ibid. p.63.
[17] . Ibid. p.21.
[18] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. Basil Blackwell. pp.66-67.
[19] . Ibid. p.67.
[20] . Ibid. p.68.
[21] . Ibid. p.69-70.
[22] . Ibid. p.53.
[23] . Ibid. p.49.
[24] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33 in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.309.
[25] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. Basil Blackwell BB pp.56-57.
[26] . Ibid. p.57.
[27] . Ibid. pp.73-74.
[28] . Witttgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell . p.24
[29] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. The Big Typescript TS 213. Ed. and Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Blackwell . p.166e
[30] . Ibid. pp.166e-167e
[31] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33 in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.310.
ABSTRACT:
This paper examines Wittgenstein's treatment of the thinking self, the "I", in the period after his
abandonment of verificationism (1932-35), as it appears in the Blue Book, the Cambridge lectures,
and the Big Typescript. Following his shift to the view that meaning is use, Wittgenstein argues
that philosophical puzzles about the self arise from confusing the various uses of the terms in our
language. He contrasts "I have toothache" with "He has toothache", and the "use as subject" with
the "use as object", to show that "I" does not refer to a body, a possessor, or an inner mental
substance. In reports of immediate experience it can be dropped: "I think" can become "It thinks".
The paper shows how this dissolves the solipsist's claim that only his own experience is real and
also the denial of that claim, since both are equally nonsensical. It also challenges the Cartesian
cogito. The paper argues that this phase continues the Tractarian "no-agent" view of the thinking
subject. Wittgenstein oscillates between old and new ideas, while the concept of "use"
increasingly shapes his account of both thought (Gedanke) and the thinking self (Seele).
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