A Study on Synthetic Biology Risks and Response Strategies in legal, ethical,
and societal frameworks

Sun-Yoo Choi

doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i05.028

Title: A Study on Synthetic Biology Risks and Response Strategies in legal, ethical, and societal frameworks
Authors: Sun-Yoo Choi
Journal: International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research (IJSSER) ISSN: 2455-8834 Volume: 11 Issue: 5 Publication Date: May 2026 DOI: 10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i05.028
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Sun-Yoo Choi St Johnsbury Academy Jeju South Korea
MLA 8 Choi, Sun-Yoo. "A Study on Synthetic Biology Risks and Response Strategies in legal, ethical, and societal frameworks." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 11, no. 5, May 2026, pp. 2261-2274, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i05.028. Accessed May 2026. APA 6 Choi, S. (2026, May). A Study on Synthetic Biology Risks and Response Strategies in legal, ethical, and societal frameworks. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 11(5), 2261-2274. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i05.028 Chicago Choi, Sun-Yoo. "A Study on Synthetic Biology Risks and Response Strategies in legal, ethical, and societal frameworks." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 11, no. 5 (May 2026), 2261-2274. Accessed May, 2026. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i05.028.
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ABSTRACT: Synthetic biology has emerged as a transformative field at the intersection of molecular biology, genetic engineering, digital design, and artificial intelligence. Enabled by breakthroughs such as next-generation sequencing (NGS), low-cost DNA synthesis, and advanced gene-editing platforms like CRISPR–Cas9, synthetic biology allows researchers to design, redesign, and construct biological systems with unprecedented precision. These developments have generated substantial scientific and socioeconomic benefits, including novel therapeutics, mRNA vaccines, gene-drive applications for vector-borne disease control, and opportunities for biodiversity restoration. However, these technologies also pose profound challenges, raising concerns about biosafety, biosecurity, and bioethics. Biosafety risks encompass the unpredictable ecological and human-health consequences of releasing synthetic organisms—including genetically modified plants, animals, and microorganisms—into natural ecosystems. These concerns reflect broader issues inherent to a “risk society,” in which uncertain, highimpact scientific risks challenge traditional legal frameworks. Accordingly, this article argues for applying risk-law principles—particularly precautions—to synthetic biology governance. Effective regulation requires systematic risk assessment, proportional risk management, and transparent risk communication. As scientific uncertainty increases, democratic participation becomes essential. Decisions about emerging biotechnologies cannot remain the exclusive domain of experts or government agencies. Ultimately, synthetic biology offers significant promise but also unprecedented uncertainty. Addressing its risks requires an integrated governance approach grounded in precaution, democratic accountability, and interdisciplinary oversight. This paper highlights the dual nature of synthetic biology and underscores the need for robust legal, ethical, and societal frameworks to guide its future applications.

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