Behavioral Constraints to Climate Policy: Explaining Public Resistance
Beyond Rational Models

Lokk Viswaveda

doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i06.004

Title: Behavioral Constraints to Climate Policy: Explaining Public Resistance Beyond Rational Models
Authors: Lokk Viswaveda
Journal: International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research (IJSSER) ISSN: 2455-8834 Volume: 11 Issue: 6 Publication Date: June 2026 DOI: 10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i06.004
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Lokk Viswaveda Chinmaya International Residential School, Coimbatore
MLA 8 Viswaveda, Lokk. "Behavioral Constraints to Climate Policy: Explaining Public Resistance Beyond Rational Models." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 11, no. 6, June 2026, pp. 2517-2534, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i06.004. Accessed June 2026. APA 6 Viswaveda, L. (2026, June). Behavioral Constraints to Climate Policy: Explaining Public Resistance Beyond Rational Models. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 11(6), 2517-2534. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i06.004 Chicago Viswaveda, Lokk. "Behavioral Constraints to Climate Policy: Explaining Public Resistance Beyond Rational Models." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 11, no. 6 (June 2026), 2517-2534. Accessed June, 2026. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i06.004.
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ABSTRACT: The paradox of modern environmental governance lies in the widening chasm between the recognised necessity of sustainable development and the persistent public resistance to the policies that enforce it. This paper critically looks at the reasons for public resistance to climate change policies, through a lens of behavioral economics. Taking economic models into consideration which explains the reasons for climate inaction through rational self interest models and collective action, this paper shows how these rational models are insufficient for effective policy making. By conducting a systematic review that compares classical economic models with behavioral frameworks, this paper explores how psychological factors and cognitive biases using nudge theory influences individual decision-making. The findings of this paper suggest that individuals often resist these policies that are supposed to benefit society mainly due to their immediate and visible costs. Moreover, the behavioral biases such as present bias amplify and add on to the perception of unfairness and uncertainty, which eventually leads to lower cooperation and low public acceptance. This paper concludes by stating that implementation of behavioral frameworks into policy design through different strategies as enlisted can create an effective choice architecture and increase public support for a long term. Moreover, this paper recommends solutions to these behavioral tendencies that prevent individuals from supporting climate interventions, and these policy recommendations could potentially improve public support, making the collective goal of a sustainable environment more possible and realistic.

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