Weaponization of Finance: Geopolitical and Economic Impacts of Sanctions

Aryan Mehta

doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i03.012

Title: Weaponization of Finance: Geopolitical and Economic Impacts of Sanctions
Authors: Aryan Mehta
Journal: International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research (IJSSER) ISSN: 2455-8834 Volume: 11 Issue: 3 Publication Date: March 2026 DOI: 10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i03.012
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Aryan Mehta Hillspring International
MLA 8 Mehta, Aryan. "Weaponization of Finance: Geopolitical and Economic Impacts of Sanctions." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 11, no. 3, Mar. 2026, pp. 1013-1034, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i03.012. Accessed Mar. 2026. APA 6 Mehta, A. (2026, March). Weaponization of Finance: Geopolitical and Economic Impacts of Sanctions. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 11(3), 1013-1034. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i03.012 Chicago Mehta, Aryan. "Weaponization of Finance: Geopolitical and Economic Impacts of Sanctions." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 11, no. 3 (March 2026), 1013-1034. Accessed March, 2026. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2026.v11i03.012.
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ABSTRACT: Economic sanctions have emerged as a primary instrument of modern statecraft, leveraging financial restrictions to achieve strategic objectives without direct military confrontation. This paper examines the economic and geopolitical impacts of sanctions through a comparative study of Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea, analyzing GDP growth, inflation, trade flows, foreign reserves, and international alliances. Using a mixed-method approach that integrates quantitative data from international financial institutions with qualitative insights from secondary literature, the study highlights both short-term economic shocks and long-term structural adaptations. Findings reveal that while sanctions impose significant economic and humanitarian costs, their effectiveness in inducing political change is limited, as targeted states employ evasion strategies, diversify partners, and strengthen alternative trade networks. The study further demonstrates that sanctions can reshape global financial alignments, promote nonWestern alliances, and accelerate systemic shifts in trade and capital flows. Overall, financial sanctions are shown to be complex instruments of economic statecraft with outcomes extending beyond immediate economic damage to enduring geopolitical consequences.

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