Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to test for the existence of moral hazard using a framework of
reimbursement policy based on internal reference pricing in Portugal. An econometric model is
used to estimate the demand for drugs, employing panel data for the drug market and for
different drug reimbursement categories. In general, no evidence of moral hazard is found, but it
can potentially appear in two situations. Firstly, moral hazard may occur with the Ministry of
Health where the demand for branded drugs includes the most highly reimbursed drugs.
Secondly, moral hazard relatively to patients may happen when demanding branded drugs.
Another relevant result is the importance of the out-of-pocket difference between generic and
branded drugs in determining the demand for drugs.
These results are relevant for policy makers in order to improve the implementation and design
of reimbursement policy |
International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
