International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Deni Angela, Meidi Kosandi

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Deni Angela, Meidi Kosandi
Universitas Indonesia

Angela, Deni, and Meidi Kosandi. "MILITARY BUSINESS IN INDONESIA: ARMY COOPERATIVE AFTER ACQUISITION POLICY 2009 AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 4, no. 10, Oct. 2019, pp. 6475-6493, Accessed Oct. 2019.
Angela, D., & Kosandi, M. (2019, October). MILITARY BUSINESS IN INDONESIA: ARMY COOPERATIVE AFTER ACQUISITION POLICY 2009 AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 4(10), 6475-6493. Retrieved from
Angela, Deni, and Meidi Kosandi. "MILITARY BUSINESS IN INDONESIA: ARMY COOPERATIVE AFTER ACQUISITION POLICY 2009 AND ITS IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 4, no. 10 (October 2019), 6475-6493. Accessed October, 2019.


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This paper examines Indonesian army's commitment today to professionalization, particularly in restraining themselves from doing business for profit through army cooperatives as they vastly did in the past during the New Order. It questions whether or not the army has given up all business for profit activities through the cooperative and focuses on building professional military in the post-New Order democracy. A qualitative research was conducted for this paper, using in-depth interviews and archive studies as the methods of data collection. This paper argues that the fact that the army persistently maintains their businesses indicates the drive to stay and contest in the political arena, instead of returning to barrack. This has affected civilmilitary relations in several ways. First, the capacity to generate income independently from the state gives the army a certain degree of leverage to the government's decision making. Second, it's partial independence reduces the capacity of the state to apply civilian control over the military through budget and policies. And third, the relatively high contestation and privilege resulted from this relation has been keeping the military a significant player in Indonesia's domestic politics that led it into oligarchy instead of liberal democracy.