International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Title:
EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD LIKELIHOOD OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES IN NIGERIA

Authors:
USMAN Tanimu Gadi , AKPAN Ekpeyo Danson , LUKA Habiba Tessy and ABOLUGBE, K. E.

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USMAN Tanimu Gadi1 , AKPAN Ekpeyo Danson1 , LUKA Habiba Tessy2 and ABOLUGBE, K. E.1
1. Department of Accounting Nasarawa State University, Keffi
2. Department of Business Education, School of Secondary Education, Vocational and Technical, Education Kaduna State College of Education, Gidan Waya

MLA 8
Gadi, USMAN Tanimu, et al. "EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD LIKELIHOOD OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES IN NIGERIA." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 5, no. 10, Oct. 2020, pp. 2891-2908, doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2020.v05i10.009. Accessed Oct. 2020.
APA 6
Gadi, U., Danson, A., Tessy, L., & K. E., A. (2020, October). EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD LIKELIHOOD OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES IN NIGERIA. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 5(10), 2891-2908. doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2020.v05i10.009
Chicago
Gadi, USMAN Tanimu, AKPAN Ekpeyo Danson, LUKA Habiba Tessy, and ABOLUGBE, K. E. "EFFECT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON FINANCIAL STATEMENT FRAUD LIKELIHOOD OF LISTED CONGLOMERATE COMPANIES IN NIGERIA." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 5, no. 10 (October 2020), 2891-2908. Accessed October, 2020. doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2020.v05i10.009.

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Abstract:
The study adopts longitudinal research design to examined effect of ownership structure on financial statement fraud prediction of listed conglomerate companies in Nigeria from 2010- 2019. The ownership structure variables of managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership were regressed against financial statement fraud probability using the Beneish M-score. The result indicates that ownership structure can significantly improve detection of financial statement fraud likelihood in listed conglomerate companies in Nigeria. As managerial ownership has a significant effect on the detection of financial statement fraud likelihood, while institutional ownership and foreign ownership has no significant effect detection of financial statement fraud likelihood in listed conglomerate companies in Nigeria. Arising from the findings, the study recommendations that the structure of organization ownership should have managers and board members with significant stake in the business as it might facilitate effective monitoring of organization activities thereby, minimizing the level of fraudulent financial activities in the organization. Also, the organization ownership structure should also include active institutional investors or their representatives for proper oversight and monitoring of the organization activities. Finally, foreign investors should take active measures in participating or monitoring the organization activities thereby, minimizing the likelihood of fraudulent financial practices.

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