International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Title:
PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE FRAUD

Authors:
Liyan Zhang

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Liyan Zhang
Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University, School of Economics and Management

MLA 8
Zhang, Liyan. "PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE FRAUD." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 6, no. 5, May 2021, pp. 1526-1536, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i05.012. Accessed May 2021.
APA 6
Zhang, L. (2021, May). PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE FRAUD. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 6(5), 1526-1536. Retrieved from doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i05.012
Chicago
Zhang, Liyan. "PORTFOLIO CONCENTRATION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE FRAUD." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 5 (May 2021), 1526-1536. Accessed May, 2021. doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i05.012.

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Abstract:
According to portfolio concentration, this paper divides institutional investors into diversified and investors, and analyse the impact of different types of institutional investors on the corporate fraud of listed companies. Based on the data of China's A-share stock market, the empirical results show that diversified institutional investors increase the number of corporate frauds, while concentrated institutional investors reduce the number of corporate frauds. And in the listed companies with weak internal governance, institutional investors have a greater impact on corporate fraud. In addition, the impact of institutional investors on corporate fraud is affected by the market environment. In the period of non-financial extreme events, the two types of institutional investors have a greater impact on the corporate fraud.

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