Richard ZOGO EKASSI1 , Bruno Emmanuel ONGO NKOA2 and Jacques Simon SONG3
1. University of Yaounde II, Cameroon
2. Corresponding author, University of Dschang, Cameroon
3. University of Dschang, Cameroon

MLA 8
EKASSI, Richard ZOGO, et al. "DOES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INCREASE FRAGILITIES IN AFRICA? A RECENT ANALYSIS." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 6, no. 7, July 2021, pp. 2511-2536, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i07.034. Accessed July 2021.
APA 6
EKASSI, R., NKOA, B., & SONG, J. (2021, July). DOES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INCREASE FRAGILITIES IN AFRICA? A RECENT ANALYSIS. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 6(7), 2511-2536. Retrieved from doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i07.034
Chicago
EKASSI, Richard ZOGO, Bruno Emmanuel ONGO NKOA, and Jacques Simon SONG. "DOES INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY INCREASE FRAGILITIES IN AFRICA? A RECENT ANALYSIS." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 7 (July 2021), 2511-2536. Accessed July, 2021. doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i07.034.

References

[1]. ACEMOGLU D., JOHNSON S. (2005), «Unbundling institutions». Journal of Political Economy, N°113(5), 949–995.
[2]. ADAMS S., KLOBODU E., KWAME M. (2017), «Urbanization, Democracy, Bureaucratic Quality, and Environmental Degradation». Journal of Policy Modeling http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2017.04.006
[3]. AOKI M. (2001), Towards Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge (USA), MIT Press.
[4]. AZARIADIS, C., (1997), «The Economics of Poverty Traps, part one: Complete Markets». Journal of economic growth, 1(4), 449-486.
[5]. BAfD (2014), Remédier à la fragilité et renforcer la résilience, Banque Africaine de Développement, Abidjan, p.42.
[6]. BALIAMOUNE-LUTZ M. (2009), « Institutions, trade, and social cohesion in fragile states: Implications for policy conditionality and aid allocation», Journal of Policy Modeling, 31, 877- 890.
[7]. BANQUE MONDIALE (2011), Crime and Violence in Central America : A Development Challenge, Banque Mondiale, Washington, DC.
[8]. BANQUE MONDIALE (2014), Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2011 : Conflits, sécurité et développement, Banque Mondiale, Washington, DC.
[9]. BAZILIAN M., CHATTOPADHYAY D. (2016), «Considering power system planning in fragile and con?ict states». Energy for Sustainable Development, 32, 110-120.
[10]. BERNAUER T. et KOUBI V. (2009), «Effects of political institutions on air quality». Ecological Economics 68(5), 1355-1365.
[11]. BERTOCCHI G. (2012), « Growth, history, or institutions: What explains state fragility in sub- Saharan Africa? ». Journal of Peace Research, 49(6) 769-78.
[12]. BERTOCCHI G., GUERZONI A. (2010), Growth, History, or Institutions? What Explains State Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa? Discussion Paper No. 4817 March 2010 IZA. CARMENT D., PREST S. et SAMY Y. (2011), « The causes and measurement of state fragility. Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses? », Oxford Scholarship Online: WIDER Studies in Development Economics, 43-67.
[13]. CLAGUE C., KEEFER P., KNACK S. (1996), « Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies ». Journal of Economic Growth, 1 (2), 243-76.
[14]. CLAPHAM C. (1996), Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[15]. COASE R.H. (1991), « The Institutional Structure of Production», Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture in Economic Sciences. Nobel Foundation: 12 pages. Reproduit dans American Economic Review, 82, 713-719.
[16]. COLLIER P., HOEFFLER A. (2004), « Greed and Grievance in Civil War», Oxford Economic Papers, 56(4), 563-595.
[17]. COLLIER P. (2007]), The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press.
[18]. CUARESMA J.C., FLORIAN H., LUCA O. (2020), «Fragility and the effect of international uncertainty shocks», Journal of International Money and Finance, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimon?n.2020.102151
[19]. DAVIS L.E., NORTH D.C. (1971), Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press.
[20]. DRYZEK, J. S. (1987), Rational ecology: Environment and political economy.
[21]. DUNNE J.P., TIAN N. (2019), «Costs of civil war and fragile states in Africa», Review of Development Economics, 23(3), 1-18.
[22]. FARZANEGAN M.R. et MARKWARDT G. (2018), «Development and Pollution in the Middle East and North Africa: Democracy Matters», Journal of Policy Modelling, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.01.010
[23]. ELLINGSTEN T. (2000), «Colorful community or ethnic witches brew? ». Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 228-249.
[24]. ENGLEBERT P. (2000), State Legitimacy and Development in Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Londres.
[25]. FARZIN Y. H., BOND C. A. (2006), «Democracy and environmental quality». Journal of Development Economics, 81, 213-235.
[26]. FRAGILITY STATE INDEX (2018), L’indice de fragilité des Etats, The Fund for peace, www. http://fundforpeace.org.
[27]. FEARON J. (2011), « Fragilité des États, indicateurs de gouvernance et risque de guerre civile », Revue d’économie du développement, 19(4), 153-186.
[28]. Gnangnon S. (2017), « Structural Economic Vulnerability, Openness and Bilateral Development Aid Flows», Economic Analysis and Policy, 53, 77-95.
[29]. HARBAUGH W. T., LEVINSON A., WILSON D. M. (2002), «Reexamining the empirical evidence for an environmental Kuznets curve», Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(3), 541- 551.
[30]. HEGRE H., ELLINGSEN T., GATES S., GLEDISH N.P. (2001), «Towards a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-1992», American Political Science Review, 95, 33-48.
[31]. HUGON P. (2009), « Le rôle des ressources naturelles dans les conflits armés africains », Hérodote, 134(3).
[32]. JUDSON R., ORPHANIDES A. (1999), «In?ation, volatility and growth», International Finance, 2(1), 117-138.
[33]. KAPLAN S. (2008), Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development, Praeger Security International.
[34]. LA H. A., XU Y. (2017), «Remittances, Social Security, and the Crowding-Out Effect: Evidence from Vietnam», Journal of Asian Economics http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2017.02.002
[35]. LASIDA E. (2014), « Revisiter l’institution à partir de la fragilité ». S.E.R. | « Études » 2014/12 décembre | pages 41 à 52, ISSN 0014-1941.
[36]. LIU K., BOQIANG L. (2019), « Research on influencing factors of environmental pollution in China: A spatial econometric analysis», Journal of Cleaner Production, 206, 356-364.
[37]. MACEDO D. R., HUGHES R.M., KAUFMANN P.R., CALISTO M. (2018), « Development and validation of an environmental fragility index (EFI) for neotropical savannah biome», Science of the Total Environment, 635, 1267-1279.
[38]. MCKAY A., THORBECKE E. (2019), « The Anatomy of Fragile States in Sub?Saharan Africa: Understanding The Interrelationship Between Fragility and Indicators of Wellbeing». Review of Development Economics, 23(3), 1073-1100.
[39]. MINSKY H.P. (1992), « The financial instability hypothesis », The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection, n° WP74.
[40]. NAY O. (2013), « La théorie des États fragiles : un nouveau développementalisme politique ? » Gouvernement et action publique, 2, 139-151.
[41]. NEWMAN E. (2009), «Failed states and international order: constructing a post-Westphalian world». Contemporary security policy, 30, 3, 421-443.
[42]. NORTH D.C. (2005), Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press, traduction française, (2005), Le processus du développement économique, Paris, Éditions d’Organisation.
[43]. NORTH D.C. (1990), Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[44]. OCDE (2017), États de fragilité 2016 : Comprendre la violence, Éditions OCDE, Paris, pp. 204.
[45]. ONGO NKOA B.E. (2019), « Effets différenciés des IDE sur la croissance économique africaine : le rôle de la finance », Revue d’Economie de Développement, 26(3), 33-63.
[46]. ONGO NKOA B.E., SONG J.S. (2018), « La qualité des institutions réduit-elle la volatilité des investissements directs étrangers en Afrique ? », Mondes en développement, 183(3), 113-131.
[47]. ÖZERDEM A., PODDER S. (2011), “Disarming youth combatants: Mitigating youth radicalization and violent extremism”. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 63-80.
[48]. RENO W. (2011), Warfare in Independent Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[49]. REYNAL-QUEROL M. (2005), «Does democracy preempt civil wars? ». European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 445- 465.
[50]. REYNAL-QUEROL M. (2002a), «Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars». Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, 29-54.
[51]. REYNAL-QUEROL M. (2002b), «Political systems, stability and civil wars». Defense and Peace Economics 13, 465-483.
[52]. RIVERA M. (2016), «The sources of social violence in Latin America: An empirical analysis of homicide rates, 1980-2010». Journal of Peace Research, 53(1).
[53]. ROBERTS J.T. et Parks B. C. (2007). A climate of injustice: Global inequality, north–south politics, and climate policy. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
[54]. RODRIK D. (1999), «Democracies pay higher wages». Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 707-738.
[55]. ROMUALD K.S. (2011). Democratic institutions and environmental quality: e?ects and transmission channels. In 2011 International congress, August 30–September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland (No. 120396). European Association of Agricultural Economists.
[56]. SAMBANIS N. (2001), «Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical enquiry (part 1) », Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45, 259-282.
[57]. SCHUMPETER J. (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper Brothers.
[58]. SCRUGGS L.A. (1998), «Political and economic inequality and the environment», Ecological Economics, 26(3), 259-275.
[59]. SINAPI C., PIEGAY P., DESMEDT L. (2010), « L’analyse des crises : MINSKY, après FISHER et KEYNES », L’Économie politique, 48(4), 85-104.
[60]. SOBEK D. (2010), «Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars ». Journal of Peace Research, 47(3).
[61]. STEWART, F. et G. BROWN, (2009), Fragile States, Working Paper No. 51. Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity.
[62]. TENDETNIK C., CLAYTON C., CATHCART K. (2018), «Education and nation-state fragility: Evidence from panel data analysis». International Journal of Educational Development, 62, 17-26.
[63]. THEISEN O.M., NILS P.G., HALVARD B. (2013), «Is climate change a driver of armed conflict? », Climatic Change, 117, 613-625.
[64]. TODARO M. P. (1969), «A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less developed countries», American Economic Review, 59(1), 138-148.
[65]. TORRAS M., BOYCE J.K. (1998), «Income, inequality, and pollution: a reassessment of the environmental Kuznets curve». Ecological Economics, 25, 147-160.
[66]. VALLINGS C., MORENO-TORRES M. (2005), Drivers of fragility: What mak es states fragile? PRDE working paper no. 7 (http: // webarch ive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/-f/ http: // www. Dfid.gov.uk/ documents / publications / fragile- states / drivers-fragility.pdf).
[67]. WAN-HAI Y., HUI-MING Z., KEMING Y., CHENG P. (2014), «Democracy, Financial
[68]. Openness, and Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Heterogeneity Across Existing Emission Levels». World Development, 66, 189-207.
[69]. WILLIAMSON O. (2001), «The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock/looking ahead». Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 595-613.