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Title: WITTGENSTEIN: THE CONCEPT OF THE THINKING SELF IN THE LATER TRANSITIONAL PHASE
Authors: Sushobhona Pal
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Sushobhona Pal Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Shri Shikshayatan College, Kolkata, India
MLA 8 PAL, SUSHOBHONA. "WITTGENSTEIN: THE CONCEPT OF THE THINKING SELF IN THE LATER TRANSITIONAL PHASE." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 6, no. 12, Dec. 2021, pp. 5058-5067, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i12.041. Accessed Dec. 2021. APA 6 PAL, S. (2021, December). WITTGENSTEIN: THE CONCEPT OF THE THINKING SELF IN THE LATER TRANSITIONAL PHASE. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 6(12), 5058-5067. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i12.041 Chicago PAL, SUSHOBHONA. "WITTGENSTEIN: THE CONCEPT OF THE THINKING SELF IN THE LATER TRANSITIONAL PHASE." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 12 (December 2021), 5058-5067. Accessed December, 2021. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i12.041.
References [1] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Generally known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.44. [2] . Ibid., p. 68. [3] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932 – 35. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell. pp. 17-18. [4] . Ibid., p.18. [5] . Ibid., pp.18-19. [6] . Ibid., p.21. [7] . Ibid [8] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930 – 33 in G.E. Moore Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.307. [9] . Ibid., p.308. [10] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932 – 35. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell.p.23. [11] . Ibid., p.22. [12] . Ibid., p.23 [13] . Ibid., p.62 [14] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1968. Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’. Ed. R. Rhees. Philosophical Review 77.pp. 275-320. p.319 [15] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932 – 35. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell.p.63. [16] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Generally, known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.67 [17] . Ibid., p.69-70. [18] . Ibid., p.49 [19] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930 – 33 in G.E. Moore Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.309 [20] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1975. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations, Generally, known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.p.57. [21] . Ibid., pp.73-74. [22] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1979. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932 – 35. From the notes of A. Ambrose and M. MacDonald. Ed. A. Ambrose. Oxford. Blackwell.p.24. [23] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2005. The Big Typescript TS 213. Ed. And Tr. By Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian Aue. Oxford. Blackwell.pp.166e-167e. [24] . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1959. Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930 – 33 in G.E. Moore Philosophical Papers. London. Allen and Unwin. p.310. [25] . Ibid.
Abstract: Post 1932, a fresh Wittgenstein emerges who insists that philosophy consists in the dissolution of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein now turns to ordinary language where the meaning of a sentence is determined from the rules of its use. Wittgenstein says the word ‘I’ has a peculiar grammar which gives the impression that the real ‘I’ lives in my body. He says that there are two distinct cases in the use of the word ‘I’ or ‘my’ which he prefers to call ‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’. There is a difference between the two categories in the sense that the cases of the first category involve the recognition of a particular person and there is in these cases the possibility of an error. The latter cases may be said to be immune from error unlike the former. Wittgenstein points out that the two words ‘I’ and ‘LW’ in ‘I am LW’ do not mean the same, nor do they mean ‘The person who is now speaking’. Nor do they mean that ‘I’ and ‘LW’ mean different things. It only means that these words are different instruments in our language. This paper discusses the concept of the thinking self in this context. When we use the word ‘I’ as a subject, it creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which however has its seat in our body. This seems to be the real ego, the self as distinct from the body. This is the point made by Wittgenstein.

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