International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Title:
A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY OF ELECTION FRAUD

Authors:
Mitch Kunce, Ph.D.

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Mitch Kunce, Ph.D.
DouglasMitchell Econometric Consulting, Laramie, WY USA

MLA 8
Kunce, Mitch. "A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY OF ELECTION FRAUD." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 6, no. 3, Mar. 2021, pp. 760-770, doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i03.001. Accessed Mar. 2021.
APA 6
Kunce, M. (2021, March). A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY OF ELECTION FRAUD. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 6(3), 760-770. doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i03.001
Chicago
Kunce, Mitch. "A JURISDICTIONAL THEORY OF ELECTION FRAUD." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 6, no. 3 (March 2021), 760-770. Accessed March, 2021. doi:10.46609/IJSSER.2021.v06i03.001.

References

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Abstract:
Very little of the voting literature addressing election fraud considers federalism and its effect on the election apparatus. Largely this is due to attention focused away from malfeasance in established democratic nations. Evidence of electoral fraud in canton democracies is becoming more common. This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model of jurisdictional choice that provides insight into what now appears to be a routine degradation of elections in democratic nations. Using a standard neoclassical construct of production in tandem with a collective-choice procedure for making local public decisions, the model centers on a jurisdiction's choice of a tax rate and the level of allowed election fraud. Within a basic model of homogeneous jurisdictions it is shown that the collective-choice rule generates socially efficient decisions in both taxes and election standards. The model is then extended to a Leviathan based Niskanen-type of local government behavior that leads to suboptimal outcomes.

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