International Journal of Social Science & Economic Research
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Title:
NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NIGERIA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (NEITI)

Authors:
Andrew Aondohemba Chenge PhD , Abel Ehizojie Oigbochie PhD and EmemUdoh

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Andrew Aondohemba Chenge PhD1 , Abel Ehizojie Oigbochie PhD2 and EmemUdoh3
1. Department of Public Administration, Federal University, Wukari.
2. Department of Public Administration, Veritas University, Abuja.
3. Department of Public Administration, University of Abuja.

MLA 8
Chenge, Andrew Aondohemba, et al. "NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NIGERIA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (NEITI)." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 7, no. 6, June 2022, pp. 1458-1487, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.002. Accessed June 2022.
APA 6
Chenge, A., Oigbochie, A., & Udoh, E. (2022, June). NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NIGERIA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (NEITI). Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 7(6), 1458-1487. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.002
Chicago
Chenge, Andrew Aondohemba, Abel Ehizojie Oigbochie, and Emem Udoh. "NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NIGERIA EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (NEITI)." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 7, no. 6 (June 2022), 1458-1487. Accessed June, 2022. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.002.

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ABSTRACT:
Natural resources have shown capacity for stimulating economic development in resource-rich countries. Revenues from natural resources provide opportunities to escape poverty, develop economically, and sustain peace. But paradoxically, evidence shows that natural resource abundance impels the resource curse. NEITI was established as a national sub-set of the global EITI to avert the resource curse menace. The study examines the role of NEITI in natural resource revenue governance and economic development in Nigeria. The Rentier State theory was used as the theoretical basis for the study. The study used mixed methodology which combines the use of survey and documentary research designs. Data was obtained from field surveys and secondary sources. Descriptive statistics and content analysis were employed as methods for data analysis. Findings revealed that NEITI’s strategies have enhanced resource revenue transparency but have not enhanced resource revenue accountability, and consequently have not enhanced economic development in Nigeria. The study recommends that invigorated resource revenue accountability which serves as a linkage between resource revenue transparency and resource led development must become NEITI’s priority in order to achieve economic development in Nigeria.

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