IJSSER

Title: WHEN ECONOMICS OVERWEIGHS LAW IN GATT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND KOREA – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
Authors: Bohan Zheng
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Bohan Zheng The Peddie School ,New Jersey
MLA 8 Zheng, Bohan Zheng. "WHEN ECONOMICS OVERWEIGHS LAW IN GATT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND KOREA – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, vol. 7, no. 6, June 2022, pp. 1588-1617, doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.010. Accessed June 2022. APA 6 Zheng, B. (2022, June). WHEN ECONOMICS OVERWEIGHS LAW IN GATT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND KOREA – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research, 7(6), 1588-1617. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.010 Chicago Zheng, Bohan Zheng. "WHEN ECONOMICS OVERWEIGHS LAW IN GATT: CASE STUDY OF JAPAN – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND KOREA – ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES." Int. j. of Social Science and Economic Research 7, no. 6 (June 2022), 1588-1617. Accessed June, 2022. https://doi.org/10.46609/IJSSER.2022.v07i06.010.
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ABSTRACT: Why do consumers purchase and select certain goods over others? What sort of products would be considered “like” or directly competitive or substitutable (DCS)? The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has always been the center of World Trade Organization (WTO) trade disputes, and this paper analyzes the crucial Article III of GATT, the National Treatment (NT) obligation. The modern history of trade has offered many cases that revolve around discrimination against foreign countries and protection of domestic markets through trade. This paper uses two cases regarding alcoholic beverages as examples and analyzes the essence of ad valorem taxes, as well as legal alternatives to them. This paper views the modern effects that cause consumers to reject the classic demand theory, and seeks the true definition of “likeness.” The claim that the GATT and WTO dispute settlement process is overly legal and insufficiently based in economics is central to understanding the notions that we put forth.

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